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China under Xi Jinping

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"Xi Jinping Administration" redirects here. Not to be confused withXi Jinping–Li Keqiang Administration.
Xi Jinping Administration
Lấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì trung tâm đảng trung ương

5th generation Communist leadership of
the People's Republic of China
Incumbent
Date formed15 November 2012
People and organisations
Head of stateXi Jinping
Head of governmentLi Keqiang
Li Qiang
No.of ministers31
Member partyChinese Communist Party
Eight minor parties
History
ElectionsNovember 2012
October 2017
October 2022
Legislature terms12th National People's Congress
13th National People's Congress
14th National People's Congress
PredecessorHu Jintao Administration/
Xi–Li Administration
China under Xi Jinping
Simplified ChineseTập Cận BìnhThể chế
Traditional ChineseTập Cận Bình thể chế
Literal meaningXi Jinping System
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified ChineseLấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì trung tâm đảng trung ương
Traditional ChineseLấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì trung tâm đảng trung ương
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core
Second alternative Chinese name
Simplified ChineseLấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì tổng thư ký đảng trung ương
Traditional ChineseLấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì tổng thư ký đảng trung ương
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary
This article is part of
a series about
Xi Jinping
Policies and theories
Key events
Diplomatic activities
Xi Jinping's signature

Xi JinpingsucceededHu JintaoasGeneral Secretaryof theChinese Communist Partyin 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's 4thleadership core,followingMao Zedong,Deng Xiaoping,andJiang Zemin.[1][2][3]

The nameXi Jinping administrationis officially called the "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary"(Lấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì tổng thư ký đảng trung ương) from 2012 to 2016, and "Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core"(Lấy Tập Cận Bình đồng chí vì trung tâm đảng trung ương) since 2016.

Xi's political ideas and principles, known asXi Jinping Thought,have been incorporated into thepartyandnational constitutions.As the central figure of thefifth generation of leadershipof the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the Internet. He and the CCPCentral Committeepassed ahistorical resolutionin November 2021.

His rule is often described as an authoritarian leader by political and academic observers, while his tenure has included an increase ofcensorshipandmass surveillance,deterioration inhuman rights,including theinternment of a million Uyghurs in Xin gian g(which some observers have described as part ofa genocide), acult of personalitydeveloping around Xi, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018.

In economic policy, Xi has prioritized poverty alleviation and creatingcommon prosperityto reduce disparities in wealth. Xi's administration seeks to implement common prosperity in part through its education policy, including through drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Xi continues to emphasize the need for global development, including through theBelt and Road Initiative.

In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes theCommunity of Common Destiny.He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers" ) like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak."

Economic policies[edit]

See also:Economic history of China (1949–present)andTargeted Poverty Alleviation

Xi Jinpinghas set three overarching goals for China's economy.[4]: 10 First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules.[4]: 10 Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market.[4]: 10 Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor.[4]: 10 

During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to use SOEs to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased[5]: 138 while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs.[5]: 141 Although China has promotedits national champion companiessince the Jiang Zemin administration,[6]: 158 it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector.[7]: 91 

Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development.[8]: 135 These industrial plans includeMade in China 2025,the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry".[8]: 135 China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development.[8]: 135 

During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy ofdual circulation.[9]: 170 First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers.[9]: 160 Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology.[9]: 160 

By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.[10]: 228 At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries.[7]: 259 As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010.[9]: 88 

China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%.[7]In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion.[7]

Education reform[edit]

See also:Education in China

Xi has implemented a number of education reforms.[4]: 155 Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours).[4]: 155 Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term.[4]: 155 Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned.[4]: 156 

As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children.[4]: 156 In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector.[4]: 156 

The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals ofcommon prosperity.[10]: 67 Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor.[11]: 5 Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits.[4]: 156 Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital."[4]: 156 They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays.[4]: 156 

Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals.[4]: 57 Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors.[4]: 157 

Foreign policy[edit]

Main articles:Foreign policy of Xi Jinping,Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,andBelt and Road Initiative

During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.[4]: 188 Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.[4]: 188 

In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created theNational Security Commission(NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.[12]: 180 The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.[12]: 180 Xi introduced theholistic security conceptin 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[13]: 3 

During the Xi Jinping era, theCommunity of Common Destinyhas become China's most important foreign relations formulation.[13]: 6 In his foreign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreign friends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to theSecond Sino-Japanese war.[14]: 42 For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people likeClaire Lee Chennault,Norman Bethune,Dawarkanath Kotnis,and Soviet pilots.[14]: 42 

Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak".[15]: 103 

During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa.[16]: 87 

Political thought[edit]

Main article:Xi Jinping Thought

"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Partyhaving gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[4]: 21–26 

In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes.[14]: 32 He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook".[14]: 32 Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence".[14]: 32 Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlightingits five thousand years of history.[14]: 33 He often cites theFour Great Inventionsas a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity.[14]: 33 In his discourse for foreign audiences regardingChina's peaceful rise,Xi quotes theConfuciansaying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others."[14]: 64 In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholarChen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients."[14]: 64 

Current members[edit]

Standing Committee[edit]

These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[17]
Rank Officeholder Hanzi 19th PSC Birth PM Birthplace Academic attainment No. of offices Ref.
1 Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Tập Cận Bình Old 1953 1974 Beijing
Graduate
Twelve
 [18]
2 Li Qiang Li Qiang Lý cường New 1959 1983 Zhe gian g
Graduate
Fifteen
 [19]
3 Zhao Leji Zhao Leji Triệu nhạc tế Old 1957 1975 Qinghai
Graduate
Four
 [20]
4 Wang Huning Wang Huning Vương hỗ ninh Old 1955 1984 Shanghai
Graduate
Eight
 [21]
5 Cai Qi Cai Qi Thái Kỳ New 1955 1975 Fu gian
Graduate
Fifteen
 [22]
6 Ding Xuexiang Ding Xuexiang Đinh Tiết tường New 1962 1984 Jiangsu
Graduate
Thirteen
 [23]
7 Li Xi Li Xi Lý hi New 1956 1982 Gansu
Graduate
Four
 [24]

Politburo[edit]

These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[25]
Officeholder Hanzi 19th POL Birth PM Birthplace Education No. of offices Ref.
Cai Qi Cai Qi Thái Kỳ Old 1955 1975 Fu gian Graduate
Three
 [26]
Chen Jining Trần cát ninh New 1964 1984 Liaoning Graduate
One
 [27]
Chen Min'er Trần mẫn ngươi Old 1960 1982 Zhe gian g Graduate
One
 [28]
Chen Wenqing Trần văn thanh New 1960 1983 Sichuan Graduate
One
 [29]
Ding Xuexiang Ding Xuexiang Đinh Tiết tường Old 1962 1984 Jiangsu Graduate
One
 [30]
He Lifeng Gì lập phong New 1955 1981 Guangdong Graduate
Two
 [31]
He Weidong Gì vệ đông New 1957 1978 Fu gian Undergraduate
Two
 [32]
Huang Kunming Hoàng khôn minh Old 1956 1976 Fu gian Graduate
One
 [33]
Li Ganjie Lý làm kiệt New 1964 1984 Hunan Graduate
One
 [34]
Li Hongzhong Lý hồng trung Old 1956 1976 Shenyang Graduate
One
 [35]
Li Qiang Li Qiang Lý cường Old 1959 1983 Zhe gian g Graduate
Eight
 [36]
Li Shulei Lý thư lỗi New 1964 1986 Henan Graduate
One
 [37]
Li Xi Li Xi Lý hi Old 1956 1982 Gansu Graduate
Two
 [38]
Liu Guozhong Lưu quốc trung New 1962 1986 Heilong gian g Graduate
One
 [39]
Ma Xingrui Mã hưng thụy New 1959 1988 Heilong gian g Graduate
One
 [40]
Shi Taifeng Thạch thái phong New 1956 1982 Shanxi Graduate
Two
 [41]
Wang Huning Wang Huning Vương hỗ ninh Old 1955 1984 Shanghai Graduate
One
 [42]
Wang Yi Vương nghị New 1953 1981 Beijing Graduate
Two
 [43]
Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Tập Cận Bình Old 1953 1974 Beijing Graduate
Eleven
 [44]
Yin Li Doãn lực New 1962 1980 Shandong Graduate
One
 [45]
Yuan Jiajun Viên gia quân New 1962 1992 Jilin Graduate
One
 [46]
Zhang Guoqing Trương quốc thanh New 1964 1984 Henan Graduate
One
 [47]
Zhang Youxia Trương lại hiệp Old 1950 1969 Beijing Graduate
Two
 [48]
Zhao Leji Zhao Leji Triệu nhạc tế Old 1957 1975 Shandong Graduate
One
 [49]

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