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| 1439157138
| 9781439157138
| B004G8QSD0
| 4.10
| 769
| Aug 09, 2011
| Aug 09, 2011
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really liked it
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If you've ever read one of Henry Kissinger's books and thinks he's a genius, then this book will be a real eye-opener. The author has painstakingly go
If you've ever read one of Henry Kissinger's books and thinks he's a genius, then this book will be a real eye-opener. The author has painstakingly gone through recently declassified or released material, as well as the memoirs of several players, to piece together the deceit and failures of Kissinger and the Nixon Administration that led to the collapse of the Shah of Iran and the "special relationship" the US maintains with Saudi Arabia today. Cooper shows conclusively that an overconfident and economically incompetent Kissinger made promises to and deals with the Shah during the Nixon Administration, then tried to keep both the promises and the consequences secret from Gerald Ford when he was kept on as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, then destroys the evidence when Carter comes to power, setting the next President up for the next crisis. Cooper also shows what details Kissinger omits from his memoirs, or identifies the odd, out-of-the way efforts Kissinger defends decisions or outcomes in the anticipation that one day these details would be public. You can sum up the broad plot line like this: The dilemma for the US-Iran relationship was basic economics: The Shah needed higher oil prices to fund his government programs, primarily his vast military. The military equipment and infrastructure projects required US equipment and expertise, so everything from fighter jets to engineers were contracted to Iran. The Nixon administration was constantly promising more-- Nixon promised "everything but the (nuclear) bomb." The Nixon Administration could go along with the higher prices in exchange for these large deals for the Defense sector and an anti-Soviet and pro-Israeli ally in a Middle East where Egypt, Syria, and Iraq got Soviet arms and expertise against Israel. Iran also was able to funnel money to Nixon's secret campaign bank account in Mexico, aiding Nixon directly. But higher oil prices led to stagflation in the West, and political pressure for Western politicians to be hard on Iran. Iran, meanwhile, suffered from "Dutch disease" as an oil producer. The increase in government spending and influx of foreign investment led largely to spiraling inflation and social unrest. When Ford took the helm, Kissinger worked hard behind-the-scenes to keep the promise to the Shah, while never fully disclosing them to Ford. When Ford's team finally began to purge and reorganize in view of the coming election, they pivoted toward friendship with Saudi Arabia, which by this time was a much larger-volume producer and was proving itself to be a more publically stable ally. Breaking OPEC and inflation to preserve Western democracy, particular in places like Europe which were seeing Communist-leaning parties gaining votes during high unemployment, was more important. The pivot was fatal to Iran. All of Nixon and Kissinger's secret deals, misguided economic understanding, and political tightrope during the Ford administration went whitewashed from their personal histories. I picked up this book expecting something similar to Daniel Yergin's The Quest, on the development of the global oil trade, or Stephen Kinzer's The Brothers, which focuses on White House and CIA-led efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to secure the Middle East as a source of oil and a bulwark against the USSR. Instead, I was pleasantly suprised by an almost day-by-day account of the period from 1967-1977 where foreign policy was directed mainly by Kissinger and Nixon where promises were made and then covered up. Whether it's uncovering that U.S. officials offered to sell nuclear power and fuel to the Shah, or made a deal where the Shah would transfer money to Nixon's secret and illegal campaign bank account in Mexico, this book is a sobering reminder that the Nixon administration was criminal in many ways. The implication of the book, of course, is that the genesis of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia led to the indirect funding of Saudi projects like madrasas in Pakistan that train the Taliban to Bin Laden's mission to attack America for supporting the Saudi regime and the endless war we have on terrorism today. Cooper, now a news correspondent in Tehran, became motivated to write this book during the late aughts (2000's) when Saudi Arabia was intentionally overproducing oil to maintain a low price. Much was written in the US about the effect on the coal and natural gas markets, the Saudis seemed bent on putting fracking out of business. Less, however, was written about how this was an intentional economic attack on Iran by Saudi Arabia. A lower price of oil hurt the government's ability to provide services as well as stem the tide of dollars to terrorist groups like Hezbollah. It also helped further the post-election unrest under Ahmadinejad. Cooper began studying history and found a similar US-encouraged Saudi action in 1977, which crippled the Iranian economy and eventually contributed to the shah's ouster and the establishment of the Ayatollahs' Islamic Kingdom we know today. But this seemed an oddity-- the Shah was a very publicly-supported US ally and his government's weakening had obvious downsides for the US. The 1977 Saudi-US relationship was actually about breaking the OPEC cartel, but instead broke the Shah and led indirectly to the US hostage crisis, the "seige of Mecca" in 1979 (see Trofimov's excellent book), the spread of Wahabbism, and the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen we see the US participating in daily (daily bombing campaigns) under the Trump Administration. What was odd, however, was that the American players involved seem to go out of their way to mention what led to these decisions or any reflection on their consequences when they wrote their memoirs. Cooper sets out to solve the mystery. The problem started in roughly 1966 when Richard Nixon was pondering a run for President and laid out his foreign policy doctrine. The Shah's brother-in-law, foreign minister, future Ambassador to the US, Ardeshir Zahedi began to get closer to Nixon when he realizes he is running for President. Nixon visited Tehran in 1967. Nixon recognized that US-style democracy was not for everybody, and expressed his open admiration for Shah Pahlavi. The Shah, meanwhile, wanted to be a revived King Cyrus, ruling over an influential Persian Empire. Cooper chronicles that his dreams of grandeur seem to get worse as he aged and became more delusional. Other prominent characters in the book include US Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur II, defense contractor and likely CIA operative David Rockefeller, CIA Director and Iranian Ambassador Richard Helms, and Treasury Secretary Bill Simon. MacArthur was the Ambassador in Tehran from 1969-1972 and filed either false or naive reports about the Shah's situation at home. This was over a decade in which the US largely looked the other way as the unrest grew and attacks on Americans and American interests became more coordinated and frequent. Rockefeller worked defense deals with Iran for equipment and manpower that helped break Iran's budget and put the Administration on the line to deliver. The State Department's own official account of the 1969-1972 period can be found here. Nixon and Kissinger negotiated heavily with Iran, culminating with a visit by Nixon to Iran that was staged heavily by the Shah. Nixon's group narrowly missed disaster during a coordinated bombing campaign and protests during their visit, something that was chalked up to student dissidents or foreign elements--a theme that would keep running until the Ayatollah Khomeini would return and seize power. The dealings with Iran get ever-complicated in the midst of the volatile oil market, the Vietnam War, Middle East conflict, and unfolding Watergate scandal. Basically, Nixon arranged to sell massive amounts of F-14s and other equipment to Iran, along with US military and defense contractors to maintain them, in exchange for oil. The Shah donated to Nixon's re-election campaign via a bank in Mexico City, which the CIA was fully aware of. Kissinger negotiated complicated finance arrangements including Iran's sending part of its aircraft purchases to Vietnam, Iranian tankers docking in Guantanomo Bay, and more. Nixon also pledges to arm the Shah's ally of the Iraqi Kurds as a further bulwark against the Sunni-Baathist Iraqi threat against Iran. Now-released transcripts reveal some of Kissinger's dealings and the quotes aren't flattering. The Joint Chiefs of Staff actually spied on Kissinger, raiding his filing cabinets and such, to see what deals he was making that would commit US armed forces without their knowledge. True to persona, Nixon was privately supportive of Iranian oil price hikes while publicly critical. Nixon had a tense relationship with Helms and the CIA, and often threatened to gut the agency because he knew it had dirt on him. These were the days just prior to the 1975 Church Committee hearings on CIA activities that revealed the "family jewels" of various assassination plots, and domestic spying by the CIA and the US Army. Nixon lost his nerve in 1972 to gut the agency, but would roughly appease and get rid of Helms by making him Ambassador to Iran. (Helms would later be indicted for perjury for his 1973 confirmation hearings testimony regarding clandestine activities, pleading guilty to a lesser charge.) One weakness of the book is that the author ignores other international economic pressures that came into play. The Bretton Woods system of coordinated exchange rates ultimately tied to gold limited the ability of countries to deficit-spend. When the US began to run deficits under Johnson to pay for Vietnam and the War on Poverty, programs continued by Nixon, the system was put under a basic pressure that the Nixon finally "closed the gold window" and unilaterally ended the post-war era that resulted in floating exchange rates and market turmoil. (I recommend Yergin and Stanislaus' Commanding Heights alongside Yergin's other books on energy markets.) He also doesn't really look much at Nixon's controversial domestic economic policies during the gas price crisis of 1972-1973, namely wage and price controls. Economic advisor George Schultz was dismissed as a naive fool for advocating against Nixon policies, but the author doesn't exactly spell out the debate. He also doesn't explain well how the high oil prices were to the USSR, helping prop up an internally-crumbling Soviet economy for another decade. All that played a role in Soviet support for various Middle Eastern regimes. Instead, the author focuses on the import of oil and the effect of prices on domestic production. High oil prices were crippling to American businesses and products (like plastics) which are made from petroleum. But they are also a boon to domestic production and exploration. In order to support high prices for the Shah, Kissinger preferred arguments about the benefit of high prices to encourage domestic production and keep out foreign oil. Cooper notes that Kissinger neglected to ask for any study about what amount of reserves the US government had available to tap to relieve the problem and what the effect on price would be, much less any long-term consequences. Kissinger consistently ignores contingencies and unintended consequences. But stagflation in Europe led to negotiations involving European countries, oil companies, and OPEC countries. There was a fear that the economic malaise was increasingly tilting politics toward Communist parties and nationalism. There was fear, specifically, about losing Italy to the Communists. European countries were suddenly at risk of defaulting on their bonds, unable to make the interest payments. (This brings to mind the EU sovereign debt crisis during and after the 2008-2009 recession.) If the debt crisis had worsened, the contagion would have had consequences for the US as well. Meanwhile, domestic pressure within Iran began to mount. The Iranian public always resented the US-led coup by Kermit Roosevelt that installed the Shahs and kept Iran in Western orbit. The Shah's infidelity was public, the press was under his thumb, and his security forces sometimes wantonly killed people for minor offenses, much less jailing and torturing many. The Shah's decision to exile Ayotollah Ruhollah Khomeini, thinking that would be better than executing him, of course ended up having consequences as a committed opposition could be formed outside of Iran as well as inside. Iran was eager for US defense contract deals because the more Americans working in Iran, the more likely the US would have to defend Iran from any attack by Iraq or others; the Shah's paranoia about invasion drove his ridiculously large military purchases. Iran saw Saddam Hussein as a threat, and at one point wanted to invade Kuwait pre-preemptively fearing Hussein would take it (1990, anyone?). Meanwhile, King Faisal was guiding the Saudis as a rival power in the region and vying for attention. Qaddafi took power in Libya and nationalized the oil production, putting more power in OPEC's hands. In 1973, the US and Israel ignored both the Shah and King Faisal's warnings that an Egyptian-led war with Israel was coming. The US found itself suddenly in a weak position to help its ally Israel in the middle of the Watergate crisis. The oil embargo was crippling the US and leading to anti-Arab, anti-Iranian sentiment. Iran and the Nixon Administration considered various military responses to the embargo, and how to get oil to the US. The Shah had placed his vast order of military equipment before 1973, and now that US pledge was in jeopardy. The scariest episode, worth pondering in light of fears during Trump's first 100 days (as I write this), is probably when a distraught-over-Watergate Nixon got drunk and passed out as the Soviets began to mobilize their military. Kissinger and Alexander Haig pondered whether the USSR would invade the Middle East while the US was obviously distracted. There is a scene where Haig shuttles to the West Wing and the residence, pretending he is getting instructions from Nixon. I grew up in the 1980s and 1990s, so the information we have on the incompetent and clearly corrupt Nixon Administration that was unavailable while he was alive is quite sobering-- this book makes me realize America has been in decline for a while and the 1970s were much worse than 2017 (for now, at least). The US had already entered into some defense contracts with Saudi Arabia, troops and contractors were helping build defenses there when the Saudis suddenly grew concerned that the US might actually invade their land. Scoop Jackson and the original Neocons were printing serious proposals in conservative magazines by 1975 calling for outright seizure of Middle Eastern oil fields. (How many Americans remembered this history in 1991 or 2003?) The US had already reached arms agreements with the Saudis, and US troops and contractors were helping to build defenses when Saudi Arabia got concerned they might face imminent invasion. Ultimately, this at least made them scared enough to finally bend to US demands for greater oil supply. The embargo led to some decision-making and frustration with the Shah. New Treasury Secretary Simon was initially made fun of by Nixon and Kissinger, but grew into his role and tended to disagree with Kissinger on various issues and was no fan of the Shah. While the Shah paraded himself as an educator of women, a proponent of Western values, and others he was truly an autocrat who increasingly ruled by the sword as opposition within his country was growing. As Nixon resigned and Ford took the helm, he was left out of the complete loop of what Kissinger and Nixon had had pledged to the Shah-- not just defenses but nuclear energy technology. Kissinger had "learned economics from the Shah," according to Cooper, seeing the world of oil markets his way. Worse, Kissinger would "disparage" Ford as incompetent in private meetings with the Shah, undermining any trust. The Shah began to publicly criticize the US government and public opinion was not favorable of the Shah. After the Ford Administration got settled, its top advisors, including Donald Rumsfeld, began to clean house. Cooper writes that Rumsfeld "stalked" Kissinger, being rightfully distrustful. This was the time of the "Halloween Massacre," when Kissinger was removed from his post as National Security Advisor in favor of Brent Scowcroft. Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger as SecDef; Cooper writes of the rampant corruption in defense deals involving actual uniformed officers in Iran (Kermit Roosevelt was also implicated in corruption). William Colby was fired from the CIA. Some of these moves were likely to help Ford beat Ronald Reagan's challenge for the GOP nomination, something Ford was was quite bitter about, personally. At the height of the 70's relationship, 40,000 Americans were living in the country. Iran was important to the CIA, which was running a program called Ibex that collected signals intelligence and Soviet radar/intercept defense capabilities from bases in Iran. American expats, which the Shah had worked so hard to intentionally attract via contracts, were living privileged lives with classic "Ugly American" stories. In a conservative country, Westerners were showing up with halter tops and shorts to visit mosques as tourists. As expats flowed in, the cost of housing rose to meet demand, infrastructure had to be expanded, and inflation ran rampant. The world had a petrodollar recycling problem. Kissinger, now of diminished political influence, had secret meetings and cryptic messages with one of the Shah's top advisors. Meanwhile, the Shah's top advisors are keeping knowledge of the Shah's medical condition--cancer-- a secret from the Shah himself. It's unthinkable for the Shah of Iran to have a terminal illness. Iran's condition worsened; it now needed a bailout, a better economic deal to supply oil to the US than what it had. Rumsfeld and others move to nix it while Gerald Ford pivots toward Saudi Arabia. While Iran needed higher prices to prop up the Shah's government, the Saudis were eager to undercut. Ford had inherited a stagflation mess, and in the run-up to the election, the American economy began to stall again. Alan Greenspan was Ford's CEA Chair, and the author basically blames him for having rose-colored glasses when bad economic data came in. The author writes that in 1975, Congress had passed and Ford approved over $15 billion in tax cuts and stimulus spending. While this was contrary to Ford's ideology of smaller government, it was seen as a goo idea at the time. Cooper writes that much of the stimulus went unspent, blamed on the economic bent of Ford's team (Greenspan, Simon, etc.) which was more free-market and small-government oriented. Apparently Arthur Burns is also to blame in regards to interest rate policy. But while Arthur Burns did lead the FOMC to raise interest rates in April and May of 1976, he followed by lowering rates from July to November. So, I am skeptical of the 1976 economic history as Cooper tells it. There are other versions. Like the collapse of Bretton Woods during this period, monetary policy generally is beyond the scope of this book (and the authors' expertise) but important to the economy and the politics. ... see my blog for more details ...more |
Notes are private!
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Apr 03, 2017
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Apr 12, 2017
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Apr 29, 2017
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Kindle Edition
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| 0312560168
| 9780312560164
| 0312560168
| 4.10
| 3,975
| unknown
| Oct 27, 2009
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really liked it
| (I read this book as part of a lot of several in order to learn more about the history of Al Qaeda and ISIS. A list of books in the order I recommend (I read this book as part of a lot of several in order to learn more about the history of Al Qaeda and ISIS. A list of books in the order I recommend reading them is located at the bottom of this post.) I noticed that there were zero one-star reviews for this book, and I'd say that's about right. It is a clear portrait of life in the austere Islamic jihad from people who saw it from the inside and got out. You might have to take some of the things in this book with a grain of salt, but much of it rings true. I finished Steve Coll's book on the Bin Ladens before beginning this one, and I recommend them in that order. Coll gives greater background into the life of Osama bin Laden's (OBL) father and where the details are fuzzy in Coll's account, this book makes more clear. Coll lacked access to the information in this book, he was unaware that OBL had taken his family on a trip to America, for example. The most glaring difference between the account of Najwa and Omar Bin Laden would be Omar's insistence that his father averted his eyes at women, and largely treated them respectfully, in contrast to other men who were abusive. But soldiers testify that when OBL was killed, there was a large porn stash recovered from the site, similar to what was found at other Al Qaeda sites. Omar wrote of an OBL who shunned much of technology and television; perhaps OBL's habits changed when he was sequestered away in his secret compound. But there are plenty of examples in the book of the many sins of OBL that were unknown to his family until long after the fact. Osama bin Laden's family was kept largely in the dark about all of his activities, but were not completely shielded from the aftermath. Osama's own stories to his family and other relatives give the authors a glimpse into Osama's childhood. His wife leaves his father, Mohammed, at an early age; Osama is just one of 54 children. He has an understanding stepfather. There are a couple of occassions where he meets with his father, which makes things awkward for his stepfather. Osama is a young boy when Mohammed dies. Omar is Osama Bin Laden's fourth son and simply wants his father's approval and love, competing for it with his other siblings. He relishes even just having a photo taken with him, or being held by him-- these things rarely happen, less so as OBL becomes more engrossed in his operations in Afghanistan. Najwa, OBL's first wife, was born and grew up in Latakia, Syria and was a cousin to OBL. Just as OBL's father Mohammed had married a Syrian, so would Osama. She liked to play sports and music and eventually the two become infatuated with each other that OBL arranges to ask for permission to marry; he was 17, she was 14. OBL and Najwa move to Saudi Arabia where Najwa needs to engage in a much more conservative lifestyle. Women do not even pray in the neighborhood mosques in Saudi Arabia. Najwa paints a rosy picture of OBL-- a construction worker, a nature lover, an economics and management major, the father of young children who is respectful and listens to her. They lived in Jeddah, Najwa loved going to Mecca. She writes that they went to Indianapolis for two weeks in 1979, Osama traveled to Los Angeles, ostensibly for his father's construction business but much is left to speculation. Osama never graduated and after 1979 became more interested in Islamic studies and lifestyle, more involved in politics and concerned about the world. The Seige of Mecca in 1979 (I highly recommend Trofimov's book) is not mentioned, but it is clear that 1979 is a turning point-- perhaps beyond the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. When they are in America, they encounter the odd stares from strangers at the airport, looking at her hijab. Osama is highly interested in the Islamic reforms of the 1970s, the Palestinian jihadi Abdullah Azzam is his mentor and convinces him to join the war in Afghanistan. OBL comes home and regales his sons with war stories, hosting other jihadi fighters and recruiting more resources. Omar apologizes to the reader and public for his father, but he also loves him as any son loves a father. He wants to earn his father's affection. Osama is a champion memorizer and recitor of the Koran. Omar never writes much about his own religious devotion. He injures hifa father accidentally when they are playing outside, and OBL has to go to the hospital. Osama becomes increasingly harsh and angry with the boys, caning them for little reason, except he is nice to his wives. Osama wanted to discipline the boys and prepare them for hardship. To lessen their dependence on material things and increase their devotion to Islam. Because of OBL's desire for "many children for Islam," he marries his second wife after Najwa bears him five children. He only did it if Najwa approved, they talked it over. He would add two more wives and the family moved to Medina. The house becomes filled with children and luxuries are moved out. Osama was against modern medicine, against refrigeration, but allowed the family to use electricity. One odd aspect of the austerity was the minimum hydration, even in the heat of summer. For Najwa this is difficult because she new him before his austerity. Osama even opposes asthma medication for a child striken with the ailment, putting him at risk. Again, it is hard to square this with the man and his creature comforts at his Pakistani compound when he was killed. Abdullah Azzam was assassinated in 1989 and Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. Saddam has a farm with his network of former Afghan jihadi warriors and believes that Saudi Arabia will call on them to defend the holy soil from Saddam's imminent invasion. Rather than seek Osama's guidance, the Saudi government raids his farm suspecting him of terrorist activities. OBL's family writes that the last straw was when international troops took up the defense of Saudi Arabia, female troops in the American ranks being the largest insult to Islam. It was here that Osama decided the Saudi regime must go, and the Western crusaders be removed from anywhere close to Mecca. OBL moves his family to Khartoum where they again establish a somewhat happy/stable life of austerity. Farming sunflowers gives bin Laden pleasure. Only contracting malaria causes OBL to finally cave to receiving medical treatment. In Sudan, the family has Christian neighbors and interacts with another religion for the first time. While the kids played with each other, Osama disliked the Christian families-- he also disliked the pet pigeons of his children. The man comes across as truly cruel here, and surrounding himself with increasingly creepy and cruel individuals. There are men threatening rape as punishment, a friend who was raped and killed as being guilty. A servant taht kills a pet monkey becauses he believes it to be a Jew. These men are not impressive and jive with the descriptions given by FBI interrogator Ali Soufan in his book (below), where he writes that many of Al Qaeda were not very knowledgeable about the Koran or Islam and rather easily duped if they felt there was something in it for them monetarily or in terms of prestige. The co-author, Jean Sasson, takes the time to explain to the reader OBL's activities in Sudan that the family was apparently kept in the dark about in the 1992 period. OBL's brothers arrive to plead for bin Laden to return, perhaps promising amnesty, which OBL rebuffs and then they fear the worse. Assassins visit their house at one point. It's clear bin Laden's refusal to return to Saudi has angered powerful people. OBL takes Omar on a trip to Afghanistan to begin the preparation to bring the rest of the family when it is safe and possible. Omar misses his mom, and the destination is kept secret until Omar arrives in country. One piece that was unknown to me was OBL's tense courtship of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He needed Omar's blessing to live and operate in the area, but it was a long time before he finally received the greeting of welcome. The Taliban's religious philosphy was even more strict than the Wahhabism of Al Qaeda. Yet, the Taliban listened to dreams and tolerated ancestor worship. Expressing sorrow over death is seen by all as the same as criticizing Allah, since it is his will that someone died. Bin Laden can finally relax when Mullah Omar welcomes him and invites him into an alliance. They see Israel and America as part of the same force, and Israel as the stronger of the two. Hence, attacking the weaker America seems to be the smarter idea. Omar is relieved when his mother and the rest of his family arrives. There are more births, and Najwa encourages OBL to spend more fatherly time with his sons. Omar develops a rebellious streak and loses favor to his brother Mohammed. He writes that he doesn't believe any of his brothers could be OBL's lieutenants, they were not raised as soldiers, and he is skeptical of media or intelligence reports otherwise. Among other sad things the boys withness is their puppies being used as experiments of nerve gas. "My father hated his enemies more than he loved his sons." With many wives and 20 children, their paths will of course be diverse. Omar takes a trip to Sudan and has an adventure ostensibly trying to find a bride. He returns to Afghanistan in time to learn of the Tazania and Kenya bombings and to see Al Qaeda's elation. He witnesses President Clinton's cruise missile strike that actually did kill many Al Qaeda fighters, though not as many as it could have. Omar begins mulling an escape plan at this point. He leaves to start a new life in Jeddah but returns after his grandmother tells him he has been summoned back. He learns from OBL's men that there is a giant plot underway, and Omar begins to dread the future. His father has lowered his expectations for what he will become, and he uses his mothers next pregnancy as a way to plead for her to leave the country before giving birth. Eventually, OBL relents. Omar witnesses 9/11 from his uncle's home in Saudi Arabia, his mother had left with three children to her home in Syria just days before; she was likely warned of what was about to happen. Omar begins an awkward new life, marrying, divorcing, and marrying a much older British woman. Wikipedia tells me he's now considered bipolar and is constantly paranoid, not difficult to imagine. Jean Sasson closes the book with some explanations that the family reached out to her to write the book because she had written other works on on the history of women in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia. I give this book 4.5 stars, a must-read if you're interested in Osama bin Laden and the history of Al Qaeda. Many are skeptical of how little Omar knew, but what he provides here is an interesting portrait and probably useful for intelligence profiling. - Al Qaeda and ISIS books: The Siege of Mecca - Yaroslav Trofimov (5 stars) The Bin Ladens - Steve Coll (4 stars) Growing Up Bin Laden - Najwa and Omar Bin Laden (4.5 stars) Guantanamo Diary - Mohamedou Ould Slahi (4.5 stars) The Black Banners - Ali Soufan (5 stars) Black Flags - The Rise of ISIS - Joby Warrick (4.5 stars) ISIS - Jessica Stern (4 stars) ISIS Exposed - Eric Stakelbeck (2.5 stars) The Rise of ISIS - Jay Sekulow (1 star) ...more |
Notes are private!
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not set
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May 2016
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Oct 20, 2016
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Hardcover
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| 1101202726
| 9781101202722
| B0015DYKPC
| 4.00
| 1,841
| Jan 01, 2008
| Apr 01, 2008
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really liked it
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(I read this book as part of a wider set to better understand the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS. See full list of books below this review.) After I finishe (I read this book as part of a wider set to better understand the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS. See full list of books below this review.) After I finished this book, I followed up with Growing Up Bin Laden and highly recommend them in this order. Coll's book gave me much information about Osama Bin Laden (OBL)'s father that was unavailable to Bin Laden's wife and son in the latter book. But OBL's family provided much more detail on the events outlined by Coll, and their memories and timelines match up well. Coll's book is much more about the wider Bin Laden Group than Osama himself. After all, Mohammed Bin Laden had 25 sons and 29 daughters, and of course their paths would have much diversity. It's a misconception in the West that the Bin Laden group bankrolled OBL's lifestyle, he had access to a small fraction of the state and according to Growing Up Bin Laden (and The Black Banners by FBI agent Ali Soufan), that money was used up quickly and OBL and Al Qaeda were often hard-pressed for cash. The Bin Laden story reads a bit like The Godfather trilogy, or perhaps the soap opera Dallas, where the brothers all go their different ways but bear the same name. They are united by name and palace intrigue. Much of this book focuses on the rise of Mohammed Bin Laden and the rise of his construction empire and relationship with the Saudi royal family. But Coll begins the book with a glimpse into the life of Salem bin Laden, who was known in America as a playboy, hosting a "royal continental party" with no end until his death in a plane crash in 1988. Salem was Mohammed's eldest son and became responsible, after Mohammed's death in 1967, for maintaining the business empire and its relationship with the Saudi royal family, members of which he hosted on his jaunts across America. Salem courts American women and hosts lavish parties in juxtaposition to his half-brother Osama who is living in caves helping wage war against the USSR and developing his devotion to austere Wahhabism. American political powers have always had a complicated relationship with Saudi money and influence. Coll writes of how King Faad contributed to a Cayman Islands bank account to fund Iran-Contra under Reagan in the 1980s. There are plenty of other books written about this influence (See House of Bush, House of Saud as just one example). Salem's chief job seemed to be to keep both the Sauds and political powers in America happy in ways that would pay off well for the Saudi BinLadin Group. He is both a Western-educated playboy with multiple relationships with women but also a seemingly sexist and over-protective brother to his sisters. His mercurial personality is a symptom of his insatiable desires and of course this ends tragically-- he dies at 42, crashing an ultralight aircraft he was flying without a helmet. Mohammed bin Laden was born in Yemen and migrated to Jeddah where he worked in construction. Mohammed's time in Jeddah coincided with British Arabist/diplomat/spy Harry St. John Bridger "Jack" Philby, who had become an advisor to Saudi monarch Ibn Saud. Oil was the interest of both the British and Americans, and both Philby and bin Laden had connections to Standard Oil of California's interest in Jeddah that later morphed into Saudi-ARAMCO in 1936. Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and suddenly money poured into construction projects. Mohammed bin Laden the bricklayer had started a construction company and came to the attention of Saudi monarch Abdul Aziz; Bin Laden began building mansions in Saudi Arabia. The American firm Bechtel began many modernization projects in Saudi Arabia, including building pipelines. Bechtel contracted some of this work to Sulaiman S. Olayan's General Contracting Company. The GCC was essentially what the Binladin Group would eventually become. Mohammed Bin Laden's company starting building mosques around the Middle East, then received larger contracts for dams and canals. Once Bechtel left, Bin Laden picked up their contracts and constructed a power station in 1951. By now, Mohammed had 15 sons and nine daughters and his company became the preferred entity for building the House of Saud's largesse. King Faisal cemented an alliance with bin Laden as he came to power in 1964. Coll recounts Faisal's governmental reforms and his battling Baathists and other insurrectionists after 1967. Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 to Alia from Syria, who was likely an Alawite. Alia was just one of 22 wives the construction magnate had. OBL had little contact with his father as his mother left him at an early age. The profligate Mohammed died in a plane crash in 1967, leaving behind his business empire. Coll did not have the access to bin Laden's childhood that is recounted from OBL's family's retelling in Growing up Bin Laden. King Faisal was assassinated by his nephew in 1974 and King Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud took the throne. Faisal had been courted by the US for years and would maintain the policy of trading oil access for aid, trade, and protection. Meanwhile, Salem bin Laden took the reins of his father's empire. Salem set a precedence for migration to America where his children and other family members would live and attend universities. His lifestyle led some to question whether or not he was "looney." In contrast, his half-brother OBL began reading the works of Muhammed Qutb, brother of radical Sayyid Qutb who helped found the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Coll writes that the 1973 Israeli-Egypt war was a formative moment for OBL. When radicals seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the Binladin group helped the government combat the seige (I highly recommend Trofimov's The Seige of Mecca). Apparently some of the Bin Laden clan were also arrested as part of the group of attackers. OBL was also influenced by the same ideas as this group and would later adopt the same goals of purifying Saudi Arabia of its Western influences. 1979 also marked the Soviet invastion of Afghanistan and the Saudi-spearheaded response of supporting the jihad. This effort united OBL's interests with that of his secular siblings; it united both secular and separatist across Saudi Arabia, something that helped cement the House of Saud's grip on power for the time being. Coll writes that the 1982 Israel-Lebanon war and its aftermath also influenced OBL. (Again the much better details of how OBL was influenced in these years, and his Western travels and education that Coll does not cover are in their book). In 1980, Yeslam bin Laden became chairman of the Saudi Investment Company in Switzerland, also adopting a Western lifestyle and marrying Western women. After Salem dies in 1987, Bakr bin Laden became chairman of the Saudi Binladin group. He was responsible for maintaining the family's trust accounts in Switzerland. This account was transferred after the end of the 1991 Gulf War and would never be used in a Western banking system again. Osama, raised largely separate from his family's lifestyle, owned 2.4% of the company in the 1980s. OBL, frustrated by the Saudi's decision to turn to the US for protection against Saddam in 1990, is eventually forced to move his former jihadi fighters to Sudan (events not covered well by Coll), where he plots terrorist activities. When OBL refuses to heed his brothers' requests that he return to Saudi Arabia, he flees to Afghanistan and his family sells his shares in the Binladin Group, denouncing his activities in 1994. Interestingly, OBL's nephew Abdullah became a Harvard academic who also began to preach Islamic extremism in America in the 1980s, coming under FBI investigation in 1996 along with his brother, Omar. Abdullah and Omar may have preached anti-semitism but there was little anyone could do about their activities because Abdullah apparently had a diplomatic passport (and perhaps Omar did as well). Coll reported that Abdullah sold his home in Virginia months before 9/11 and left the country before the attacks. Omar possibly had some connection to planning the attacks but was ferried out of the country with the rest of the Bin Laden family after 9/11, the family receiving explicit permission from Colin Powell to fly while the rest of the nation's flights were grounded. Omar was never interviewed by the FBI, despite large files and an ongoing investigation on himself and Abdullah. Coll speculates as to whether Abdullah and Omar were raising funds for OBL's terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Four of the 9/11 hijackers lived just down the street. The FBI raids the group Abdullah chaired, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, in 2004 in an investigation on terrorism financing; the group was banned elsewhere and testified against in the 9/11 commission hearings. I find accounts on this part differ. Some say that Abdullah left before 9/11, but a New Yorker article from November 2001 documents that Abdullah was the only bin Laden to remain in the US for a time after 9/11. He claims he was willing to help the FBI but they never asked. Coll writes that the Saudi embassy told the FBI they could not interview him because they claimed him as an attache with diplomatic immunity. http:// newyorker /magazine/200...It appears that Omar was the one doing the preaching and perhaps fundraising, and that his ties to Abdullah were not allowed to be completed. Wikileaks revealed that Abdullah would be the bin Laden to officially request OBL's death certificate in 2011. As I write this in 2016, Congress has just overidden Pres. Obama's veto on a bill that lets 9/11 victims sue the Saudi's for potential involvement, an effort that Coll's investigative reporting has fueled. The bin Laden family engaged in various PR and legal moves in the US and elsewhere to protect their assets both from confiscation and investigation. (In his biography by Ron Suskind, Former Treas. Secretary Paul O'Neill documents the investigation of financing of terrorism after 9/11 that reached a "dead end" when it got to Saudi Arabia.) The Washington-oriented Carlyle Group's involvement with the bin Ladens and their connections in escorting the family (and other Saudi nationals) out of the country ASAP after 9/11, even those under FBI investigation, is a frustrating (if largely forgotten) part of history. Coll documents the CIA's relationship with the Saudi government and the mutual distrust. The CIA were listening to Osama in Afghanistan and apparently getting little help from the Saudi government. Coll breaks down the translation of OBL's interviews before and after 9/11. While various Arab and Islamic scholars and sociologists I have read recently criticize the use of a "clash of civilizations" to describe the current state of affairs, that is clearly how OBL saw the problem because it is written as such in the Quran. The Binladin group continues to grow under the leadership of its chairman Bakr, and continues to be responsible for lucrative building projects in Saudi Arabia. In all, I give this book 4 stars out of 5. If interested in Osama bin Laden, don't read this book without reading Growing Up bin Laden. This website appears to have the entire recorded history on the bin Laden family, much of which is left out of this volume and would fill many volumes if every lead were pursued:http:// historycommons.org/timelin... Other books on the history of the Middle East and Saudi Arabia would also be helpful. Also, consult other sources more recent than this book, it would be interesting for Coll to write an update based on now-available information. Other books on Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and ISIS I read coincidentally: The Siege of Mecca - Yaroslav Trofimov (5 stars) The Bin Ladens - Steve Coll (4 stars) Growing Up Bin Laden - Najwa and Omar Bin Laden (4.5 stars) Guantanamo Diary - Mohamedou Ould Slahi (4.5 stars) The Black Banners - Ali Soufan (5 stars) The Rise of Isis - Jay Sekulow (1 star) Black Flags - The Rise of ISIS - Joby Warrick (4.5 stars) ISIS - Jessica Stern (4 stars) ISIS Exposed - Eric Stakelbeck (2.5 stars) Jihad Academy: The Rise of ISIS (not yet read) ...more |
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Mar 2016
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Oct 15, 2016
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Kindle Edition
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| 0385519257
| 9780385519250
| 0385519257
| 4.20
| 2,377
| Sep 18, 2007
| Sep 18, 2007
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it was amazing
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The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine I recently reviewed several books on the history and development of Islam and Middle Ea The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine I recently reviewed several books on the history and development of Islam and Middle Eastern history, modern critiques of Islam and views to reform, and books about human rights in Islamic countries written predominantly by women (full list at bottom of this post). I did that to set a foundation for trying to understand the development of ISIS and other radical groups, for which I read several other books on modern militant Islam (list also at bottom). This list will grow as new books become available and I find time to read older books as well. But this book should be read in the context of having read the others. The Siege of Mecca is a must-read for understanding the roots of Al Qaeda, the history of US and European interaction with Islamic extremism, and for putting much of today's struggles into context and the beliefs of jihadis such as ISIS who eagerly await the Mahdi. I had read other books on the US' relationship with Saudi Arabia before (ex: House of Bush, House of Saud), but all seem to ignore the events of 1979. In 2016, the tragedy of Benghazi comes to mind quite a bit, but in 1979 there were attacks on US embassies around the world due to the seizing of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a radical Islamic group wrongly attributed to the US (and Israel); it is a wonder how an Ambassador or other staff were not killed then. Most of the world has forgotten November 20th, 1979 because it was lost in the Iranian hostage crisis, the Egyptian-Israeli peace deal, and other events. Trofimov has done an outstanding job researching this book and bringing events to light. Since reading this book, several others have mentioned this book, including one by Bin Laden's family. The events in the aftermath of 1979 help explain both the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, the rise of the religious police and more overt Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and its export abroad in the 1980s to today, and the US policy of establishing bases in the Middle East to show strength. The author begins with a history of the community of brothers in the Wahabbi sect in Saudi Arabia. There is much in the history of Wahhabism that the books on the history of Islam and the Middle East on the list below were quite helpful in understanding. The House of Saud made a Faustian bargain with cleric Muhammad ibn Wahhab in which the Sauds would be the ruling family while the Wahhabs would be the dominant religious sect. At the time of the Siege, Saudi Arabia was ruled by Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud who was King of Saudi Arabia from 1975 to 1982. His father had been King Faisal, who had abolished slavery in 1962 and been committed to other reforms and closer ties with the West before being assassinated by a rebellious nephew in 1975. These kings were seeing a growth in oil revenue and and survived on the deals made with religious clerics long ago. Bedouins began to move into the growing cities, bringing their more conservative backgrounds with them. Among influential clerics of the day was Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, who would later become the Grand Mufti. Ibn Baz was a prominent Salafi who was part of a wider conservative network that Trofimov documents brainwashed members. It was during this time that the doctrine of the Mahdi, which many incorrectly associate mostly with Shi'ia Islam, was revived. In the 1970s, members of the Black Panthers and other foreign dissident groups were learning in Saudi mosques and schools. There was a growing sense of insecurity as Saudi Arabia relied upon the West for military aid and technological know-how in building projects while being completely reliant on oil exports to support the entire economy and social state. There was greater uncertainty as Saudi Arabia's chief rival, Iran, threw off the yoke of its US-backed dictator in favor of a religious state. The CIA had been weakened by Congressional investigations, its failure to see what was happening in Iran, and the Jimmy Carter administration more interested in peace than espionage. To the Wahhabists, Westerners on sacred Saudi soil were akin to Christian invaders in the Crusades. Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaybi was one member of the group which seized the Grand Mosque. He studied the Hadiths even though establishment clerics discouraged the process due to how complicated the Hadiths are. Juhayman was a devoted disciple of Ibn Baz and became opposed to the Saudi royal family's policies and lifestyles which were clearly out of conformity with strict Islamic principles. Juhayman's father had made the same charge against King ibn Saud in the 1920s. Juhayman's intensely conservative beliefs caused him to break with Ibn Baz and demand change. Juhayman's Sunni eschatology includes the Dajjal returning to earth as a false messiah (same as the Christian antichrist), and Isa (Jesus) returning to destroy first the Dajjal, then the Jews. (Shi'ia apparently believe it is the Mahdi who will do this.) In Sunni strains, the Mahdi appears to be similar to the Isa figure, he is a mortal man who will establish a right and peaceful Muslim rule some time before the Judgement Day in which Isa returns. Juhayman's brother-in-law, Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani, apparently fit the bill. His first name is Mohammed, as it is believed the Mahdi will be, and his family hails from the North. Members of their band of several dozen radicals apparently have dreams and visions that compel them to believe that al-Qahtani is the Mahdi, and the fervor seems capture al-Qahtani's mind as well. Many were formerly in the military, and the group apparently had enough connections and funding to be heavily armed, disciplined, and well-trained. The assault on the Masjid Al-Haram in Mecca is set for November 20th, the first day of the Islamic lunar calendar, which also is the date the Mahdi will supposedly reveal himself. There is widespread confusion after the seizure of the Grand Mosque. Senior Saudi leadership is out of the country at the time. Some of the guards believe that Abdullah Mohammed al-Qahtani is indeed the Mahdi and that they are in an eschatologically important moment. The US Embassy begins shredding documents, fearing the worse and suspecting the Iranians have captured the mosque complex, enraging the Saudis by leaking such ideas to the media. The Ayatollah Khomenei broadcasts that the US and Israel have taken over the complex, un unquelled report that causes uprisings all over the world. The Saudis were reluctant to quash the rumors because they did not want to acknowledge the Mosque had been seized from under their watchful eye and they were mad at the Americans for leaking the disturbance. President Carter dispatches a carrier group to the Persian Gulf. Consulates and other sites were attacked from Turkey to Pakistan. Trofimov writes that the future would-be assassin of the Pope, Mehmet Ali Oğca, was motivated by attack on the Grand Mosque to escape from prison during this, and the belief of Western involvement may have contributed to his desire to murder the Pope on his visit to Turkey in 1981. In Pakistan, the US Embassy was overrun by armed rioters. Embassy staff were rounded up into vaults while President Carter and the Ambassador to Pakistan tried uselessly to contact the Pakistani President. American airlines offices and other consulates around the country were attacked and burned, two American soldiers died. The Pakistani leadership played a political game and refused to refute the rumors. Pres. Carter later claimed that he had apologized and offered to pay reparations, but others dispute this and Trofimov writes that the US Marines cursed Carter for this incident for the rest of his short-lived presidency. Secretary of State Vance moves to evacuate the embassies all over the Muslim world. Trofimov writes that there was American veteran in civil defense who worked in the complex, he had simply uttered the Shahada to work in the place. Two Americans disguised as pilgrims were able to sneak into the complex and take video crucial to intelligence for the counter-strike. An African-American was part of the rebel group that was attacking armored personnel carriers, and another was also involved. One of the two was later executed and their identities were never revealed. During fighting with Saudi defense forces, the would-be Mahdi is killed. Juhayman convinces the group to continue the fight, claiming there is no proof that al-Qahtani is actually dead. To make matters worse for the Saudis, a Shi'ia uprising takes place in Katif. The Saudi government censors all the news and tries to appease the Ayatollah in Tehran while bloodily suppressing the uprising. The re-taking of the mosque was quite tricky due to the buildings being holy sites and the Saudis not having forces equipped or trained for such a task. But suddenly every Saudi prince wanted a piece of the glory for retaking Mecca and this made it even messier. While the Saudis finally publicly admitted there was a problem, calling in Americans or other infidels on the ground was out of the question, leaving the House of Saud with few options. Only the Jordanians and Pakistanis had special forces among the Muslim countries which might be up to the task, the Pakistanis sent a group of 50. The government needed fatwas to be issued giving the military cover for operations within the complex. The Saudis blasted away at minarets and other buildings, keeping the damage invisible to the outside world through media blackout. For the heavier fighting inside the basement of the Grand Mosque, the Saudis quietly reached out to the French who dispatched a group of their elite forces fresh off staging a coup in Central Africa. (The French hated President Carter's policies as well.) 11 men arrive with no identification and the task of training the Saudis properly. The task is complicated by not even being able to draw a schematic of the buildings without it being sacrilege. Three commandos have to show conversion to Islam in order to enter the complex and engage in operations. The fighting lasted until Juhayman and over 60 others were captured on December 4th. In the end, Juhayman and his gang were executed. Juhayman was sort of a martyr for his cause of Islamic purity, some of his writings make it to Egypt where they are embraced by other radicals; one of whom assassinates Anwar Sadat in 1981. The US begins negotiations with Oman about building a naval base and the USSR counters US moves toward the Gulf by increasing its troop buildup on the border of Afghanistan-- the USSR would invade just a few weeks later. Jimmy Carter changed his policy to one of more aggressive stance, backing the CIA's operations with the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. The House of Saud, quite shaken by the brazen assault on their rule, makes further deals with clerics like Ibn Baz to keep their rule safe and further fund Wahhabist schools and mosques and causes globally. One of those causes was taking on the USSR in Afghanistan. The Sauds must have realized that such a group could not engage in such a brazen attack without wider funding and resources. Most of the Saudis are in the same positions when the book was written in 2007 as they were in 1979. The events of 1979 would further inspire Osama bin Laden to be active in Afghanistan, and later pick up where Juhayman left off-- cleansing the holy sites of foreign influence and decadence. I give this book 5 stars out of 5. A must-read for anyone interested in foreign policy, history, Saudi Arabia, or how the West is now at war with an increasingly violent jihad. It is also an interesting book on the spread of subversive ideas among small, committed groups. Apologists like John Esposito seem to argue that 1979 was the violent end to an isolated fringe group, rather than the beginning of the growth of increasingly large armed groups of Wahhabis and Salafis bent on large-scale attacks like 9/11. Trofimov does a good job laying out the facts and their importance. Books I read prior to or subsequent to the above: A History of Islam, The Middle East, and Arab nations: A Very Short Introduction to the Koran - Michael Cook (4.5) A Very Short Introduction to Islam - Malise Ruthven (3 stars) In the The Shadow of the Sword - Tom Holland (4 stars) In God's Path - The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire - Robert G. Hoyland (4 stars) Great World Religions: Islam (The Great Courses)- John Esposito (1.5 stars) Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes - Tamim Ansary (4.5 stars) Brief History of the Middle East - Peter Mansfield (3.5 stars) History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani (4.5 stars) The United States and the Middle East 1914-2001 (Great Courses) by Salim Yuqub (3.5 stars) Islam Unveiled - Robert Spencer (1.5 stars) Lawrence in Arabia - Scott Anderson (5 stars) Islamic reform-style: Desperately Seeking Paradise - Ziauddin Sardar (5 stars) Sam Harris and Maajid Nawaz - Islam and the Future of Tolerance (1.5 stars) Reza Aslan - No god but God - The Origins and Future of Islam (2.5 stars) Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus - Nabeel Qureshi (4.5 stars) Human and women's rights: Infidel - Ayaan Hirsi Ali (4.5 stars) Heretic - Ayaann Hirsi Ali (4 stars) Headscarves and Hymens - Mona Eltahawy (4 stars) I Am Malala - Malala Yousafzai (5 stars) I Am Nujood, Age 10 and Divorced by Nujood Ali (4.5 stars) In the Land of Invisible Women - Qanta Ahmed (4.5 stars) Between Two Worlds - Zainab Salbi (5 stars). City of Lies - Ramita Navai (3 stars) Reading Lolita in Tehran - (read earlier) Half the Sky - Nick Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn (4 stars) Foreign policy/Americans traveling in Middle East and Central Asia: Between Two Worlds - Roxana Saberi (2.5 stars) Children of Jihad - Jared Cohen (4 stars) The Taliban Shuffle - Kim Barker (4 stars) A Rope and a Prayer - David Rohde and Kristen Mulvhill (4 stars) Left of Boom - How a Young CIA Case Officer Penetrated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (3.5 stars) Al Qaeda and ISIS books: The Siege of Mecca - Yaroslav Trofimov (5 stars) The Bin Ladens - Steve Coll (4 stars) Growing Up Bin Laden - Najwa and Omar Bin Laden (4.5 stars) Guantanamo Diary - Mohamedou Ould Slahi (4.5 stars) The Black Banners - Ali Soufan (5 stars) The Rise of Isis - Jay Sekulow (1 star) Black Flags - The Rise of ISIS - Joby Warrick (4.5 stars) ISIS - Jessica Stern (4 stars) ISIS Exposed - Eric Stakelbeck (2.5 stars) ...more |
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Feb 2016
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Oct 08, 2016
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Hardcover
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| 1402210876
| 9781402210877
| 1402210876
| 3.74
| 7,699
| Sep 01, 2008
| Sep 01, 2008
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really liked it
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I recently reviewed a host of books on the history and development of Islam and Middle Eastern history (list at bottom of this post). I also read seve
I recently reviewed a host of books on the history and development of Islam and Middle Eastern history (list at bottom of this post). I also read several which included some critiques along with views to the future and reform. I then worked through a list of books by Muslim women, most of which bring light to and critique inhumane practices found in their home countries. Included in this list was Nick Kristof's Half the Sky which looks at women's rights globally, and I'm also including another by someone who left Islam after an extensive intellectual and spiritual search. This book review is in the context of all of those books as a whole. The list (some reviews forthcoming): Reform and human rights: Infidel - Ayaan Hirsi Ali (4.5 stars) Heretic - Ayaann Hirsi Ali (4 stars) Headscarves and Hymens - Mona Eltahawy (4 stars) I Am Malala - Malala Yousafzai (5 stars) I Am Nujood, Age 10 and Divorced by Nujood Ali (4.5 stars) In te Land of Invisible Women - Qanta Ahmed (4.5 stars) Between Two Worlds - Zainab Salbi (5 stars). City of Lies - Ramita Navai (3 stars) Half the Sky - Nick Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn (4 stars) Seeking Allah Finding Jesus - Nabeel Qureshi (4.5 stars) Another book I strongly recommend with this one: Desperately Seeking Paradise - Ziauddin Sardar (5 stars) The author contends in the prologue that things have gotten "much better" since she wrote the book, but a recent PBS Frontline documentary I saw seems to show it's not by much. The religious police still patrol the malls and public squares bashing anyone exposing too much skin or anyone who might dare to sing or play an instrument. Like Mona Eltahawy, she has become a critic of the hijab and supports the ban on them in France, which also makes her a target of criticism by various groups. Dr. Ahmed notes that the abaya, the full-length robe worn in Saudi Arabia, is ironically sold only by men. Dr. Ahmed is a practicing Muslim of Pakistani descent, she grew up in England and studied medicine in the US. Like many physicians who study in the US, it is difficult to get a visa or eventual green card, so she took a position with Saudi national health affairs, working at a hospital. 80% of doctors in Saudi Arabia were expatriates at the time. The job brought her opportunities to learn a new culture, make the hajj, be a huge help to and example for women, and deal with great culture shock. While she has more education and experience then male colleagues, she has to deal with their consdescension and subtle harrasment. She could have a patient dying on a gurney but have to be patient as the male doctors do their elaborate Saudi greetings before getting to work. Early on, she tells the ridiculous story of dealing with a patient whose body was mostly uncovered, but her family made sure to cover her head with a veil. Dr. Ahmed can operate on people in Saudi Arabia, but like all women, is forbidden to drive a car. As a single woman, she has to deal with the plight of being an "unaccompanied woman." A single woman she knew is denied attending a distinguished fellowship abroad by her father who insists she get married first so she be she won't be unaccompanied because that would would bring him dishonor at home. Similar to Ramita Navai's City of Lies (on Iran), and Mona Eltahawy's Headscarves and Hymens (Saudi Arabia and Egypt), Qanta Ahmed's work breaks the veneer of the Kingdom. The move toward greater conservative Wahabbism came after 1979, when conservatives were increasingly given power (I recommend The Seige of Mecca by Yaroslav Trofimov to help understand this). But the religious laws and police only force underground what exists. She notes that as a doctor she saw evidence of much of the widespread drug and alcohol abuse among men. Indifelity can be covered up via hymen reconstructive surgery, which is also used by married couples. Ahmed sees much homosexuality actively covered up. She also sees many children coming in having been raped and abused, and the absence of social services in Saudi Arabia condemns them to return home to the environment in which they were abused. Islam itself painted over the historic pagan practices practiced in places like Mecca before the time of Muhammad. She notes the various beliefs and superstitions held by patients that may be contrary to Islamic teaching. Parents, for example, see their children as intercessors on behalf of their parents in front of Allah. This comforts the parents in the event of the death of the child. Parents also believe God takes away one child in order to give them another, more pious, child. The most moving experience Dr. Ahmed has is in making the Hajj. She does this as a well-off foreigner who can afford a hotel room. She notes the plight of most pilgrims, sleeping outdoors, sometimes even under vehicles, under the sun and elements. Ahmed studies the history of the Hajj itself; she notes the deeply-rooted pagan rituals around the Hajj that are now considered Islamic, as the polytheism that existed in Mecca before Muhammad is painted over like many of the other cultural beliefs and rituals she observes. Saudis themselves look down on the other nationalities visiting, something that is contrary to the spirit of the Hajj. The Saudi authorities are also increasingly trying to segregate the Hajj by gender, contrary to historic practice. Like many, the author sees this as increasingly trying to marginalize women. (Oddly, Saudi women splurge on nail polish when they are menstruating because they do not pray when they menstruate; they do not believe you can wear nail polish when you are praying.) During her prayers at the Hajj, Dr. Ahmed encounters other English-speaking women who help her understand the Hajj as well as speak and read Arabic. While making prayers one day, another women accosts her in Arabic for exposing the tips of her ears, as though she is "naked." Other women correct her practices. She goes from goat to hero as a doctor, however, providing much-needed medical care to some of the women there. The women become very appreciative of her education and profession. The minute details of the love aspirations of friends were a bit much. Some women want to marry for love, others for money, most are woefully unprepared for marriage and intimacy. The internet opened up forbidden communication between men and women, leading to much romance but also jilted would-be lovers. Many Saudis divorce because the husband wants a second wife, (many more end simply because of relational/cultural/communication complications). Some of the women professionals use younger underlings as sex partners as sort of an escape. As a foreigner, Ahmed could not openly date a Saudi man but strikes up a relationship with one of her colleagues. Her crush is not very religious, does not pray, and treats her with respect. Dr. Ahmed cites Ziauddin Sardar's work (Desperately Seeking Paradise), and I remember his lamenting at how much Saudis were trying to both industrialize the Hajj and ruin the spirit behind it. Like Sardar, the pure unity of engaging the Hajj with thousands of others moving in unison, despite different nationalities, genders, and income, clearly moves Ahmed and it appears this is what keeps her bound to her Muslim faith despite all other misgivings. As an American, maybe the most shocking/disheartening piece of new information I gleaned from the book was Dr. Ahmed's description of her educated physician colleagues openly celebrating the attacks on September 11th, even bringing in cake to celebrate because America "deserved it." She notes that the director of the hospital condemned the celebrations but many of her colleagues took part. She remarks with horror that women doctors who had just delivered babies and saved lives were now watching television and applauding murder. The afterword to this book was recorded in 2008, and in an interview she says things are rapidly changing for the better. The internet and satellite television have brought different experiences to Saudi households. Lebanese television, in particular, portrays women as powerful and educated. Saudis now have plenty of access to Western treatment of women. As I noted at the beginning of this review, this does not appear to have moved the ball much in terms of womens rights and religious freedom in the Saudi Kingdom. Perhaps now that changes are rapidly happening due to the prolongued fall in oil prices, things will get better. But it appears that conservatives are instead consolidating power and simply demanding more strict reforms in response to their growing frustration. Since publishing the book, Dr. Ahmed has been accused of being a "Zionist" for having spoken at a university in Israel and denouncing the various academic boycotts against Israel. (She notes in the book that Jewish expats have serious problems in the Kingdom.) I'll be interested to follow her journalistic writing and the rest of her career. I give this book 4.5 stars. A truly unique perspective on Saudi Arabia. Other books read on Islam before or concurrent with this one: A History of Islam, The Middle East, and Arab nations: A Very Short Introduction to the Koran - Michael Cook (4.5) A Very Short Introduction to Islam - Malise Ruthven (3 stars) In the The Shadow of the Sword - Tom Holland (4 stars) In God's Path - The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire - Robert G. Hoyland (4 stars) Great World Religions: Islam (The Great Courses)- John Esposito (1.5 stars) Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes - Tamim Ansary (4.5 stars) Brief History of the Middle East - Peter Mansfield (3.5 stars) History of the Arab Peoples by Albert Hourani (4.5 stars) The United States and the Middle East 1914-2001 (Great Courses) by Salim Yuqub (3.5 stars) Islam Unveiled - Robert Spencer (1.5 stars) Lawrence in Arabia - Scott Anderson (5 stars) Reform-style: Desperately Seeking Paradise - Ziauddin Sardar (5 stars) Sam Harris and Maajid Nawaz - Islam and the Future of Tolerance (1.5 stars) Reza Aslan - No god but God - The Origins and Future of Islam (2.5 stars) ...more |
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Jul 10, 2016
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Aug 20, 2016
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Paperback
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| 0865478031
| 9780865478039
| 0865478031
| 4.16
| 4,668
| Apr 21, 2015
| Apr 21, 2015
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really liked it
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Eltahawy writes on the subject of women's rights in Islamic cultures from having lived in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and now America. Opinions of the veil,
Eltahawy writes on the subject of women's rights in Islamic cultures from having lived in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and now America. Opinions of the veil, of course, vary around the world. I lived in Turkey where opinions among best friends vary, and in Azerbaijan where the veil tends to be found in rural villages but less in larger towns and villages. But, as the author notes, the veil is becoming more common and, disturbingly to Eltahawy, necessary to be accepted in many Middle Eastern and Central Asian cultures. She wore the hijab for years before deciding it to be a "white flag to extremism." If the purpose of covering is to keep from bringing a woman to a man's attention, it does the opposite in Western countries where the veil is rare and invites stares. If the purpose in the East is to show proper respect and submission, Eltahawy writes that it takes away the last bit of courage and self-respect that women have, and besides does not protect them from sexual harrassment and discrimination. She notes that while many people (like John Esposito) may claim the Middle East is modernizing in its attidues toward women, and more women are educated there now than ever before, the use of the veil and laws pertaining to it have grown since the early 20th century. Pictures of uncovered women in Egypt, for example, were more common in the early 20th century than today. The author traces the spread of headscarf use from working people in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the education and economic empowerment of women has resulted in a backlash. "(Men) hate us because they need us and they fear us...Women have been reduced to headscarves and hymens." She begins by telling of her frustration with the Egyptian Arab Spring, where women fought along side men in the protests, but were also raped and molested in large numbers and ultimately betrayed. She returned to Egypt to cover the story as a journalist, having already moved to America. She was targeted for rape and later criticized by a nurse treating her. "The revolution is not complete" unless and until women overturn exploitation in public as well as the bedroom. 99.3% of women polled in the Middle East experience sexual harassment, and it is her goal to expose this evil as both a violation of what is accepted as human rights and the treatment of women by Muhammad. **** The Muslim Brotherhood, which is often hailed as a somewhat moderate political pan-Islamic group, supports the traumatic practice of female circumcision (read Hirsi Ali's Infidel or Kristof's Half the Sky for the gruesome details about what this is like for a woman). While interviewing a high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood official, she is told that she is "naked, according to the Quran" for not wearing a niqab. She examines the context and intepretation of the Arabic in the verse that he cited, which is very limited in its scope anyway. (See this site for a more conservative interpretation:https:// al-islam.org/hijab-muslim...) She recounts a story about a Tunisian feminist who asked a Salafist member of parliament a question. He refused to answer it because she was not wearing a hijab. When she begins to disrobe completely, he is terrified. "I’m showing you what a naked woman looks like." He pleaded with her to stop and took her question. Eltahawy agrees with the French ban on the hijab, and the EU's Human Rights court ruling in support. She identifies other disturbing trends in Islamic countries such as Qaddafi's weaponization of rape in Libya, the exploitating of Syrian refugees, and various polls from Tunisia, Lebanon, and elsewhere where wives frequently report physical or sexual abuse in their marriages. She highlights some initiatives to record and prevent domestic violence. When Eltahawy's family lived in Saudi Arabia, she saw even further abuse of women. Eltahawy is even groped while walking during the Hajj, harassed right at the Kabaa, while fully covered and wearing a hijab. Qanta Ahmed (The Land of Invisible Women) also chronicles this poor treatment of women during the Hajj, and the attempts by the Saudi government to segregate what has for centuries not been segregated. All this aside from the ban on women driving, running for office, etc. The author writes that both the Quran and accepted hadiths speak of sexual pleasure, and of one hadith saying that preventing foreplay is cruel. Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood reject these texts or interpretations. If sexual pleasure is to be desired, why do they favor female circumcision in the name of Islam? I had thought female circumcision was relatively isolated to Africa, but she notes surveys showing it is fairly common around both the Arabian Peninsula as well as among European immigrants. Eltahawy eventually found herself a 29 year old virgin filled with guilt and unable to trust men. But she notes that men also feel guilt and deep insecurity, which probably relates to domestic violence. Unlike Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Eltahawy seems to want to remain a Muslim. She quotes modern interpretations of the Quran from progressive groups. Ponders why Aisha is always held up as the example and not Khadisha, Muhammad's first wife who was an educated business owner. She mentions the plight of the transgender and LGBT as well. In all, I give this book 4 stars out of 5. It took an amazing amount of courage to write this book. But it does not appear that Eltahawy has done a complete introspection; one senses a sequal along the lines of Hirsi Ali. One wonders if she's become bitter based on the tone, and it seems incomplete. How can she stay in a religion that promotes misogyny, and which in her estimation the majority disagree with her views? I imagine she has weighed that family and cultural cost but it is not completely present in this book. ...more |
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This is really two different books together. I give the first half a star and a half due to the disengenous and unscientific nature of Aslan's writing
This is really two different books together. I give the first half a star and a half due to the disengenous and unscientific nature of Aslan's writing. The second half, however, I find to be much more interesting and informative. I do not recommend reading Aslan's book by itself; I completed this book among several others on the history of Islam and the Middle East and several by modern Muslims highlighting injustice and pushing for reforms. Books regarding the history of Islam include Tom Holland's The Shadow of the Sword (5 stars), Robert Hoyland's In God's Path - The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (4 stars), Tamim Ansary's Destiny Disrupted (4.5 stars), Malise Ruthven's Islam: A Very Short Introduction, and Michael Cook's Very Short Introduction to the Koran. I found Ansary's book to be the most similar to the second half of Aslan's book, probably because of its similar highlights of Sufi and Shiia history since both Aslan and Ansary are quite familiar with those. Reform texts that I read include Heretic by Ayan Hirsi Ali (4 stars), Desperately Seeking Paradise by Ziauddin Sardar (5 stars), and Mona Eltawahy's Headscarves and Hymens (3.5 stars). I also listened to Sam Harris and Maajid Nawaz's interfaith dialogue which I found uninformative (1 star) and Robert Spencer's Islam Unveiled (1 star). Mansfield's Brief History of the Middle East (3.5 stars), and Hourani's History of the Arab Peoples (4.5 stars) were also helpful. The first half of the book is written as an apologetic of Islam, the Koran, and the life of the prophet Muhammad. Having read Aslan's Zealot, in which he pulls from others invented narratives about Jesus, James, and Paul, I was not surprised to find Aslan's exegetical fallacies in this book; he has only a rudimentary understanding of historical criticism, good exegesis, and hermeneutics. Where he admits "pure speculation" it is only in passing and does not deter him from writing pure speculation as actual, historical fact-- just as in Zealot. His lack of actual exegesis ruined his attempt to analyze the Pauline epistles in his book Zealot, and it ruins much of his early chapters here. The difference is that in Zealot, Aslan set out to demolish the validity of historical Christianity by speculating things into the Bible that do not make logical sense whereas in this work he sets out to affirm the writings of the Koran. He never really engages with the analysis of someone like Tom Holland, who gives evidence of the Koran being a product of its historical context and pre-existing narratives in the Middle East. Aslan repeatedly chooses to tell a story by choosing certain hadiths that fit his preferred narrative, rather than noting that scholars differ as the reliability of the overlapping hadiths. "The Clash of Monotheism" - Aslan begins with the heated rhetoric after 9/11/2001 and the "surge" of Christian missionaries into the Middle East, of which Aslan highlights a particularly bad anecdotal example. I reject his strawman because I knew missionaries (some of whom lost their lives) delivering aid, building schools, working in hospitals and orphanages, digging wells, and doing all they could to blend into the culture unoffensively, learning the language and respecting customs. "Prophets have the goal of forming national identity in their prophecies," is a claim that may sound good but does not hold up to historical scrutiny either. Some prophets are lone madmen in the desert. "Religion is by definition interpretation," and while interpretations may by definition be valid "some are more reasonable than others." That is a bit too subjective for my preference, not all interpretations of sacred texts are exegetically and hermeneutically sound. Aslan writes that the Prophet's goal was not only national identity, but "moral egalitarianism" and he labors to prove this point with a mixture of relying on minority interpretations of key words and painting a narrative from his choice of history from hadiths and his own "speculation." Muhammad did not invent ethical monotheism, but Aslan might lead you to believe as such. The author describes what is known about the region of Muhammad prior to his birth. The Kabaa, central to Islam, is "shrouded in mystery." There were plenty of worshipped polytheistic deities in Arabia prior to Muhammad, worshippers alongside Christians of various sects, Zoroastrians, Jews, and others. One sight in Yemen was already the "hub" of Christian activity in Arabia; a number of Arab tribes had already converted to Christianity. Many of these did not subscribe to the Nicene Creed and there were many unorthodox Christians present at the Kabaa in Mecca. Aslan also gives the origins of Zarathustra. According to Islam, the Kabaa in Mecca was originally built or restored by Abraham the monotheist, Abraham was chosen not by grace but because he disapproved of his family's polytheistic practices (not explained by Aslan, this is from me for free). Eventually, polytheistic worship at the Kabaa made it a pagan shrine and this drew in the diaspora such that Mecca was a center of festival and trade for many tribes and religions of the region. According to Aslan, a monotheist named Zayd ibn Amr preached in Mecca about the time of Muhammad's youth, and Muhammad was influenced by this and adopted his method later; Zayd became one of Muhammad's first converts. This apparently comes from a hadith but Aslan does not tell of its reliability, and it is unclear to me how widespread this belief is; it is another example of how Aslan takes shaky information and tells it like fact. Aslan also claims he knows the intention of those who wrote about Muhammad. "One must sift through the sources" writes the author (700,000 hadiths?), his way of saying that he takes what makes the most memorable story for book sales. Aslan gives some details about tribes living around Mecca, which he writes was not a center of trade but rather a center of worship. There was no legal code among tribes, only a sheikh and maybe an arbiter between tribes and loose confederations or agreements along with marriage arrangements. Anything that weakened the tribe was ruled illegal. (We see similarities in the Canaanite cults, intermarriage forbidden, etc.) Hence, Muhammad's code had appeal and would have been understood in its power of ultimately increasing unity. Was Muhammad commanded by Gabriel to "read" or "recite?" Aslan claims that Muhammad is not the prophet of the illiterate (it is claimed he was illiterate), but FOR the illiterate. Muhammad's message was that God could be accessed without idols and the kabaa was unnecessary. What did "umma" mean? These were the early followers, the deciders. Could it mean "neotribe?" Aslan stretches very far in painting Muhammad's Islam as women-empowering, and cites specific examples and omits others to make his case. He goes beyond too far in claiming that equality of sexes is found in Islam and not Judeo-Christianity. I am not sure what he means by equality and egalitarianism on this point. He neglects that women had property rights in Jewish law, much less that you cannot get far in the Pentateuch without encounting heroines, prophetesses, and judges. He disregards any actions by Jesus or comments by Paul on the standing of women before God. Aslan writes that, in his polygamy, Muhammad was protecting the widows of his fallen soldiers and uniting tribes through marriage. Thus, Muhammad "needs no defense" for marrying a nine year old. Aslan does not address how this is now still justified in Yemen today; read Nujood's book. In his narrative on the subject of Muhammad's marriages, Aslan conspicuously omits the Quran's tale of Muhammad taking his adopted son's wife. Al-Waqidi's early history of this event has been combined with other commentators over the years having various justifications for the action, none of which seem to play well into Aslan's narrative. Aslan claims the hijab came about because Muhammad's house was also the mosque, so people were constantly around and Muhammad wanted his wives to be protected and not to distract. "No other women wore the hijab," seems to be a ridiculous claim as just in the case of the aforementioned marriage of Muhammad to his adopted son's former wife it was because he saw her unveiled when he came upon their house unexpectedly. It was clearly already present in the culture from all sorts of historical sources on the Middle East. Aslan writes the hijab was later used by males to regain the dominance they lost under Muhammad's egalitarian rule. Further, he claims that the archaic Arabic often translated "beat them" actually might better translate as "follow them" or "sleep with them." That the majority of Arabic scholars, and at least every Muslim I've ever conversed with, disagrees with Aslan's preferred translation should be a caution. Does Aslan deny that Islam spread by the sword in its early days, that Muhammad himself had to engage in bloody battle to bring about a unity of the clans under his authority? Even though Aslan admits there is little known proof or agreement about the massacre of the Jewish Banu Qurayza clan, he denies it even possible under his egalitarian Muhammad. "Nothing could be further from the truth," he writes. Aslan doesn't even note that Abraham sacrificing Ishamel was not established until centuries after the Quran was considered canonized, since the Quran does not explicitly state who was sacrificed-- many Muslim scholars are recording as believing Isaac was sacrificed. (See Bruce Feiler's book Abraham for the history of this scholarship.) To Aslan, the fact that Muhammad mentions the patriarchs so many times is evidence he "revered" the Jews, and not, as Tom Holland and others surmise, that he was copying or co-opting already widely-known stories. In some places the author writes that Muhammad was obeying the Quran and in others he seems to imply that the Quran was written later after Muhammad's death, so which is it? Abu Bakr succeeds Muhammad as the first Caliph. Thus the rivalry with Ali begins; Bakr appointed another successor rather than leaving the choice to the shura. In 656 AD, Uthman is killed and Ali leads. Ali refused to accept the caliphate and was himself murdered in 661. The Muslim world has never been the same since. Thus ends the first half of the book, remarkably different from the second half which looks more at the socio-political Islamic history since Muhammad. Theocracy 14 centuries of Islamic thought have been shaped by the Umma, the elite early group surrounding Muhammad and acquainted with his sayings or reported sayings. There is an "inquisition" over the doctrine of the creation of the Quran -- is the Quran eternal or was it created? Current orthodoxy is that the Quran is eternal. Aslan notes that because the Quran is considered eternal, it cannot be interpreted contextually (and all words in it must be considered eternal and not borrowed from other languages present in the region at the time it was written physically). But later he writes that the "Koran was in flux during the life of Muhammad." How do we square something that was "in flux" with something that is eternal? Aslan seems to want to hold the two in tension; you can't. "The community is the church of the Muslim," which Aslan appears to be ignorant that this is the case in Judaism and Christianity as well-- the Church is not a building. In early doctrinal formation in Islam there were rationalists arguing with traditionalists, predestination versus other views. Aslan chronicles the role of the hadiths in the late 800s. The Hanbali became the most extreme of the four orthodox Sunni schools in the late 800s. From Hanbali later came the Wahabis and Salafis. Aslan covers a bit of the early Arab-Muslim civil war and the development of Shiism, Yazid versus Hussein. The Shiia eventually adopted the doctrine of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam; this doctrine was formulated in the 14th century and is state-sanctioned today in Iran. The Ayattolah Khomeni's belief is that his reign is as infallible as the Mahdi, and his job is to govern the kingdom in preparation for the Mahdi's return. Iran has "tried to merge tradionalism with pluralistic democracy and human rights and failed." The most interesting contribution of Aslan's book is delving into Sufism; I find most books on Islamic history ignore or skip over Sufism, which is radically different than Wahabbism. I've lived in Central Asia where the "pir," a place where a supposedly holy person was buried and contains mystical powers, is still a large part of locally syncretised Islam. The author gave me greater knowledge of the origin of the pir and let me see the Sufi influence, likely via Shiite occupation, of Azerbaijan. Aslan recounts 13th century parables and the love poetry of Sufism. "Sufi poetry is love letters to God," something you don't see in traditional Sunni Islam where "love" is not one of the 99 names of God. Sufi works sound more like the Song of Solomon than anything else I've seen, and it's a shame Aslan does not make the comparison. The section on Sufism is a good reminder that Islam is not monolithic. In the 19th century the Young Turks and Egyptian reformers united in an pan-Islamic cause to counter European colonialism. Salafis supported the Islamist movement, but this was later replaced by pan-Arabism as it "seemed easier." Aslan seemingly tries to connect Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founder Sayyid Qutb's roots to Sufism. Qutb initially believed in the arts and a diversity of education, and spent two years studying engineeering in America. He became increasingly critical of Western materialism and either through failing health or imprisonment became radicalized toward imposing Sharia through violence-- anything not purely non-Islamic was seen as corrupt and to be discarded. Nasser used the Muslim Brotherhood to gain power, and then quickly turned against it to consolidate his own power. Then, the Brotherhood allegedly split between those who thought social reform was possible by reforming hearts, and those who sought to take power and impose Sharia by violence, the movement we're most familiar with today. After Nasser's crackdown, the Muslim Brotherhood moved to Saudi Arabia, whose monarchy despised or was jealous of Nasser's Egypt. Aslan, like many authors, felt the need to clarify definitions: Fundamentalism = Wahabbism, and Islamism is not the same as fundamentalism. So, he does not reject the term "Islamic fundamentalist." The author recounts the alliance between Ibn Saud and Abdul Wahab, the arrangement between which one would give tacit support to the other and exists in an increasingly fragile state today (as I write this there is a Reuter's article suggesting likelihood for this alliance to remain intact in the face of such low oil prices and economic difficulty is unlikely). In the wake of WWI, the Saudi alliance with the British led to Saudi control over the land from the Ottomans, but then exploitation from the British and the US eager to secure oil. (On these events, Mansfield's Brief History of the Middle East is a better primer.) The House of Saud turned Westward and become "corrupt." Abdul Wahab, and later Sayyid Qutb, had a "goal of purging the world of Islamic diversity." Aslan gives the West a warning today relevant in fighting ISIS (and agreeing roughly with Nassim Taleb's Antifragile mentality): "Fundamentalism is impervious to suppression." When you suppress something, it simply grows underground and arises stronger at a time when the suppressant becomes weakened. Aslan does not necessarily give a policy prescription, however, and his words above make it hard to see how to find a reasonable solution, if reason is outlawed in the minds of many fundamentalists. The author agrees with those who write that the Thirty Years War is a good parallel with what is happening with fundamentlist versus moderate movements within Islam today. "Islam has finally begun its 15th century." There are several "Islamic states" already, which is why the Muslim world takes umbrage at using that term for ISIS, prefering "da3sh" instead. Aslan rejects secularism, "a closed theological view different from secularization where control passes from ecclesiastical to political control." America is 250 years of secularization based on pluralism, not secularism. Hence, the secular atheists are as much a danger to society as closed-minded Islamic fundamentalists. The author notably avoids using the "House of war" and "House of Islam" dichotomy that Muslim scholars use (begun by Sunni founder Abu Hanifa in the generation after Muhammad). As suggested above, Aslan sidesteps how Islam was spread in the early years, the "shadow of the sword" and never thinks to examine Muhammad's motives other than as that of a prophet with a national identity in mind. The second half makes up for the first half, but only just so. He never spells out what the "future" holds, contra the book title. 2.5 stars. ...more |
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| 9781565856707
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This is a set of 24 lectures by The Teaching Company giving an overview of U.S. involvement in the Middle East in the 20th century. Yaqub earned a PhD
This is a set of 24 lectures by The Teaching Company giving an overview of U.S. involvement in the Middle East in the 20th century. Yaqub earned a PhD from Yale and his old biography at the Wilson Center suggests this book sums up his published arguments and research interests. As a prerequisite, I recommend Albert Hourani's History of the Arab Peoples (goes from 600 - 1991 A.D). For more detailed information on William Yale and U.S. involvement in World War I and the Zionist movement during that period I recommend Scott Anderson's excellent Lawrence in Arabia (2014). My knowledge of American relations with the Jewish people and the Palestinian question was shaped by chapters in the second half of Freedom from Fear by David Kennedy. For a look at the U.S.-Turkey-Iranian relationship with a tangent on the Palestinian peace process, I suggest Kinzer's Reset. There are a host of books dealing with the U.S.'s relationship with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the 1991 Gulf War. You might try Prelude to Terror by Joseph Trento for a jaded view on the CIA's involvement that Yaqub can only touch on. There are several works written in the 1800s by American missionaries and diplomats to the Middle East that are available on Gutenberg and elsewhere. Yaqub could easily add five more lectures since 9/11. Although the devil may be in the details, these lectures (and accompanying note outlines) give a good overview of Middle Eastern policy mostly divided up by the terms of U.S. presidents. The student can better understand the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the triumphs and trials of Zionism, the rise of Arab nationalism, and the effects of each American president's policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Before World War II, and definitely before 1914, American involvement was largely commercial and missionary. Yaqub provides good documentation of missionary schools and hospitals and the headaches created for U.S. diplomats trying to assist citizens in times of trouble. After WWII, insuring stability, preventing communism, and safeguarding oil became the driving forces of each administration. Yaqub gives much attention to Abdel Nasser's often tenuous relationship with the U.S. from seizing the Suez Canal after U.S. rejection of aid for the Aswan Dam to the Six Day War of 1967. Nasser is the face of Arab nationalism and the mold in which many leaders seem to have followed. Yaqub does a good job tracing the history of Israel and the Zionist movement, as well as the plight of Palestinian Arabs from 1914. I appreciated that he included a lecture on the Kurds, looking at their history with modern Turkey and importance in Iraq policy. They are one of the few nationless minorities mentioned, which is unfortunate. Yaqub contrasts policies of various presidents (most of whom experienced deep and consequential failures). LBJ, for example, cozied to the Shah of Iran and to Saudi Arabia and offered little criticism of their internal human rights abuses at the same in contrast to Kennedy. Nixon was too distracted by Watergate to be trusted with any decisions during the Yom Kippur War, so Kissinger had ultimate authority. Carter was bent on peace in Palestine and defunding the military abroad but ramped up defense spending after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan's Lebanon fiasco and Iran-Contra are rehashed. The 1991 Iraq war and aftermath are also revisited. The Clinton years and his effort with Arafat and Barak to make piece are somewhat critiqued. Yaqub posits that Barak's offer was less generous than Clinton and history give him credit for. Yaqub helpfully includes a lecture on Afghanistan and its history up to 9/11. The weakness of the series is that there is little mention of Yemen, not a great deal of focus on Syria outside of its wars with Israel, and nothing the economic rise of the Emirates. Libya is not technically in the Middle East but has been important in Middle East policy and counterterrorism since the 1980s; it gets one mention. Those countries are not in Yaqub's research interests so they are noticeably absent. The accompanying notes are quite helpful, but the lectures themselves could have been edited better for quality. I give it 3.5 stars out of 5. If you're looking for a primer on U.S. policy in the Middle East, this is a good place to start. ...more |
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really liked it
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Albert Hourani - A History of the Arab Peoples, 1992 edition This book is a mile-high overview of the history of Arab peoples from Mohammed to 1991. I Albert Hourani - A History of the Arab Peoples, 1992 edition This book is a mile-high overview of the history of Arab peoples from Mohammed to 1991. I imagine it is standard textbook in an Arab Culture or Middle Eastern studies curriculum. In certain eras, Hourani has little historic and archaeological information to go on but does his best to present what we know. He does not have the space to delve into the details of any particular events, personalities, or tribal distinctions. I would have liked for him to elaborate on the linguistic differences across Arab lands, but instead he closes the book with a look at the modern political languages of Arabs: nationalism, social justice, and Islam. He also is able to give little detail when he reports particular events, such as when a leader was assassinated, and why that event was important and what exactly the context was. If you're interested in a particular region or country, check out more specific books. Histories written with narratives and anecdotes of the time are easier to read, but may contain less information. This book contains nothing of the sort and is all information. I learned much about Arab peoples and their history, the interaction with Turkish history via the Ottoman age, and a little about how modern borders were formed, although much of explanation of development of modern states is too detailed for this book. Part I: (Seventh-Tenth Century) pre-800 A.D. Muslims had copied/studied almost the entirety of know Greek texts, preserving them to be translated back into Latin in the Middle Ages. Arabs also developed on the science and mathematics found in the texts, publishing their own works. Hourani explains how tradition on Mohammed differs, his sayings were compiled first during the reign of his third successor. There is much debate about his life and the authenticity of what is recorded. Hourani returns to Koranic interpretation throughout the book, explaining how the various schools of religious and philosophical thought developed. He looks at Persian Shiite beliefs as well, the Mahdi belief arose very early. Abbasids vs Shiites, etc. Mystical experiences and writings versus more strict traditions, etc. Despite Mohammed's wishes, it appears monasticism in Christianity was influential on Muslim scholars, and some issues of Islamic doctrine mirror debates in the monophysite Christian churches as well. Paternalism was present well before Islam (and Judaism) in the Middle Eastern native cultures. Part II: Arab Muslim Societies (11th-15th centuries) Hourani looks at the spread of Islam and the interaction of Arabs, Persians, and Turks. There is a look at cities, Hourani notes that Cairo and Baghdad were likely metropolises of 250,000 before the plague. The Mamluk's controlled the land from Mecca to Cairo and ruled via vassals. Mamluk government differed from that of the Seljuk's in Anatolia. He describes the common architecture found in cities, houses, palaces, as well as the importance of Arabic writing in artwork. Wine seems to have been widely consumed despite prohibition. The Arabian Nights and other tales probably originated from other cultures and were translated into Arabic, the earliest roots seem to come from the 10th century.Schools of theology and laws became important. Islamic scholars were expected to travel around learning from various teachers to get a wide range of views. I found his discussion of "ishtihad," or "independent reasoning" in Sunni law as interesting. Only a "mujtahid" is qualified to exercise "ijtihad" in evaluating Islamic law. The Koran and Hadith were not sufficient, knowledge of history and reason were also required. (This is something ISIS apparently rejects, it is a pre-11th century version of Islam). Part III: Ottoman Age (16th-18th centuries) While the Ottomans are Turks, they ruled over the Arab people and set the stage for the modern struggles of Arab independence movements. I enjoyed the lengthy look at Ottoman government and culture. The Ottomans were innovative in that they codified their laws, including the Sharia aspects (just as Justinian had done with Roman law during the Byzantine Age, not mentioned by the author). We forget that besides the Crimean War of 1853-1856, there was the previous Russian-Ottoman conflict of 1768-1774 in which the Russians annexed Crimea. This has implications for events of today. Hourani does a good job looking at reform attempts within the aging Ottoman empire and how that later affected Arab independence movements. Turkey also dominates much of Part IV. Hourani does look at Jewish relations with Arab Muslims over the centuries as well. Part IV: The Age of European Empires (1800-1939) As Europe grew stronger and the Ottomans grew weaker, Europe made its presence felt in North Africa and the Middle East. French colonization of Algeria is examined. U.S. aid money for Lebanese survivors of a civil war in 1860 was one of the first examples of a coordinated international aid effort. The U.S. later set up schools in the area, as well as France and other powers. Germany was of large assistance to Turkey and the British took more interest in Middle Eastern oil. The first Western interest in Middle Eastern philosophy and history came in the early 1900s. Hourani mentions the 1908 Arab revolts and widespread killings of Armenians without the dreaded "g-word." I learned a bit about the development of Salafism in the 20th century and the roots of Arab nationalism in Syria. He of course looks at T.E. Lawrence and WWI but remarks that the fabled Arab Revolt is of debatable value in the war. The division to modern borders is really only glossed over in Part IV and Part V. Part V: The Age of Nation-States (since 1939) As linguistic study and literacy increased in the 20th century, so did Arab/Islamic philosophy and poetry. Hourani makes remarks on several poets who choose to publish works in the colloquial Arabic. Economic growth happened post WWII, but stagnated as countries like Egypt tilted toward Socialism and became reliant on either the West or the USSR for aid and military support. Arabic socialism as promoted by Nasser had little appeal to Islam but rather to nationalism and anti-colonialism. Hourani describes some of the political intrigue of the 1950s-1970s, with coups and assisinations. Rivalries and wars with Israel, etc. He gives an overview of how Arabs favor strong central governments, partly as a reaction to western colonialism, and partly in order to unite and subdue several competing factions within arbitrary borders (think Iraq). He also describes the evolution of the role of women both in economics and in politics. The rise of the Muslim brotherhood is described as one of several attempts to interpret Islam and its idea of social justice into modern contexts. The competition with Wahabist and Sufi schools of thought, critical today as Sunni Arabs are now at war with one another in Syria. Hourani makes no predictions about the future but clearly does not forsee current developments. The book was written before the Gulf War of 1991, so it is dated (while a later version adds an afterword with updates). I learned a lot about the Arab peoples and have a greater appreciation for the cultural history. I'm giving it 4.5 stars out of 5. I partly wish the author had broken it down into five larger volumes with more detail, but am glad for this large overview. ...more |
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| Jan 01, 2011
| Sep 20, 2011
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really liked it
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The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Making of the Modern World by Daniel Yergin This book was on a recommended reading list produced by the State Depa The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Making of the Modern World by Daniel Yergin This book was on a recommended reading list produced by the State Department under the "(Geographic) Area Studies" subheading. I would not recommend it as informational about any particular region in the world. I did not find it nearly as enjoyable as Yergin and Stanislaus' Commanding Heights, which I was surprised is not on the State Department's reading list. The first 1/3 is on the history of energy and development of oil and natural gas exploration from the early 20th century to today. (I imagine this to be taken mostly from Yergin's The Prize, although I have not read it). The book opens with a brief look at the collapse of USSR. Yergin delves into the history of Azerbaijani politics in both in the 1920s and 1990s, which I enjoyed from having lived in Azerbaijan and being familiar with the history. Yergin recounts the "Caspian Derby" for oil in the 1990s and the rise of Heydar Aliyev; the "Deal of the Century" worked out with an international consortium of oil companies and the battle to build the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The story of exploration of the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan is reminiscent of events in Syriana. The book covers the 90's mergers of BP-Amaco-Arco, Conoco-Phillips, and others as companies dealt with downturns in the oil market. I enjoyed looking at the Asian financial crisis through the lens of its effects on the oil market. There is a large divergence to explain the 2003 Iraq war. There was mention of the hopes of Iraqi oil paying for the war, but through interviews with those on the ground Yergin explains how the Iraqi oil industry was outdated with 1950s technology and how hard it was to get up to 3 million barrels of output a day, far from the 6 million hoped for before the invasion. Economist James Hamilton is mentioned in talking of how the oil boom in the 2000s mirrored the housing boom, and Bob Shiller is also profiled. The rise of Qatar with liquid natural gas is contrasted with Iran's history of being unable to develop its own fields. The history of shale gas, fracking, horizontal digging, and other technological advances are outlined. The natural disasters such as BP and the Gulf Coast, Fukashima Daichi, and more are covered. J.P. Morgan's funding of Edison is held up by Yergin as probably the first example of modern capitalism, and the author explains the politics and economics behind the battle between Edison and Tesla. He chronicles the exploits of Enron, the California energy crisis, Chernobyl, 3 Mile Island, nuclear engineering, and more. The second 1/3 of the book is a history of climate change research, policy debates, politics of global warming & climate change. John Tyndall, perhaps the first climatologist, is chronicled as Yergin gives a near complete history of atmospheric science and the debate over climate change. As late as 1972 there was a large body of scientists arguing that "global cooling" was a grave danger. Yergin handles this section very well, just the facts and the history laid out chronologically. Yergin documents the fight over international agreements such as the one George Bush '41 signed in Rio and the later Kyoto Protocols. The last 1/3 is renewables and new technology (photovoltaics, smart grids, etc). Yergin highlights all the latest advances and what is needed for renewables to dominate the market, and the challenges of the international politics. It reads like a compilation of articles found in recent issues of Time and The Atlantic. I give this book 4 stars out of five, it's really three books in one and draws out too much. It is filled with too many repeated cliches, especially at the end. Yergin keeps hedging his bets talking about new technology "this is no silver bullet," "there is no guarantee," etc. If you work in or are deeply interested in energy, technology, and climate change then this is your book. Otherwise, you'll find it boring. ...more |
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liked it
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Mr. Cockburn has worked as a journalist on the ground in the Middle East for years and seen the mess up close, he is also familiar with the Lebanese c
Mr. Cockburn has worked as a journalist on the ground in the Middle East for years and seen the mess up close, he is also familiar with the Lebanese civil war that he often compares Syria to in the book. He advocates the "bang bang journalism" that gives readers an up-front picture and criticizes colleagues (without names) whose newspapers have them cover war from, say, Istanbul. But the reality is that this book is short and other larger books give a wider view, and you can get most of what Cockburn has written from the various articles of Cockburns in The Independent and other authors in The Atlantic, The New York Times, and others. It is limited in the time period prior to 2013. Cockburn's own analysis only differs from the mainstream at points, and subtly, and not always correctly. Joby Warrick's book gives a more complete backstory of Zarqawi's Al Qaeda in Iraq that was the forerunner to ISIS that Cockburn summarizes without as much detail. Other works like Stern & Berger's ISIS and Henin's Jihad Academy delve into the eschatology, operations, and psychology of ISIS better, and several other books do a better job on Syria as a whole (see list below.) One criticism I have of the book is that the author ignores all of the hawkish advice that President Obama did NOT follow on Syria; Cockburn makes it sound like Obama went with the military/CIA/Saudi recommendations all along. He writes that Obama asked Congress for money to arm rebels in 2014 without recognizing that he went through all of 2012 and most of 2013 without arming rebels against the advice of Clinton, Panetta, Petraeus and others. Obama has famously given interviews being critical of the idea that "a bunch of farmers and school teachers" could take up arms against Assad and win. Cockburn praises the more hawkish Sec. Clinton's criticism of the Saudis' funding of Wahabbism, which makes his criticism of Obama seem a bit uneven. Further, there is a blurring of all the Sunni jihadi groups into one. Cockburn writes that "Al Qaeda is an idea, not an organization." That would seem to make all the books and intelligence on the details of that organization's structure seem fanciful. If he'd said "The Caliphate is an idea, not an organization" that would be correct as he is basically saying their Sunni-based theology and eschatology are the same. But their organizations are different enough that they are literally killing one another. Cockburn notes a video threatening Jordan in which ISIS claimed they were their descendents of Zarqawi and writes about how in 2013 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi broke from the Jahbat al-Nusra group he helped founded, but he does not mention the reasons. Nor does he mention the history of Zarqawi's issues with Al Qaeda prior to 2003. (Cockburn does not provide much detail about Baghdadi himself, maybe strange given the title of the book, but I think he simply leaves it to other authors to cover.) Cockburn recounts the failures of Nuri al-Maliki as PM in Iraq, which could only have been made complete by the simultaneous Sunni uprising in Syria that led men to arms and created furhter Sunni insecurity. He surmises that Iraq could soon descend into a civil war similar to that of Syria that could likewise rage on for years. The end of sectarian hostilities in 2006 was only temporary; hostilities have picked up where they've left off (and now Iran is playing a more obvious role). Cockburn surmises that drawing a map with sectarian boundaries could lead to more bloodshed similar to what was seen in India. (One wonders if the Balkans might be a better, more eventually peaceful outcome.) In reality, there was never a dividing line between radical jihadis and "moderate" rebels (although Cockburn later calls some elements of the FSA "secular" ). Weapons going to Syrian rebels were always going to end up in ISIS' hands either by force or because ISIS had a lot of money-- even before Mosul and Northern Iraq fell, Cockburn writes that ISIS was collecting taxes in the millions, even in Northern Baghdad (is this substantiated?). The author writes that it does little good to combat the symptoms of terrorism without attacking its cause--massive funding of Wahabbism by the Saudis. He notes the 9/11 report, reports from the EU and elsewhere that criticize Wahabbist funding of activities. Saudi primary school textbooks demonize Shiia, Jews, Christians, and others. He writes that Sunni Wahhabism crowds out other sects mainly because non-Sunni groups don't have access to Saudi funding to build mosques, centers, and other things Saudis are willing to fund worldwide. The Saudis bulldozed Shiia shrines in Bahrain. The 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia, just as the Taliban operate freely in Pakistan and attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and we reward both countries with more weapons and aid. We do nothing to those countries precisely because they buy our weapons and other goods. Cockburn writes of how the Saudis (and other Gulf states) were quick to arm rebel groups. The Gulf States perhaps underestimated how quickly Assad would fall, that would seem to have been what global intelligence estimates indicated since Obama publicly stated his belief in such. He notes that two of the Saudi ministers meeting with Syrian rebels in Ankara in 2013 have lost their jobs, a rare event in the Kingdom suggestive of recognition of failure. Another problem with the book is that perhaps Cockburn's distaste of Gulf actors tints his vision a bit too much. He is skeptical that Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons and does not mention evidence to the contrary. He doesn't report much on events from 2011-2012, although he does note that Syria has always had deep sectarian divisions that the Syrian regime has tried to gloss over. Janine di Giovanni was on the ground interviewing rape and torture victims but Cockburn does not indicate much awareness of this period. It seems from the timeline of all these books that Assad was the first to call on Hezbollah and Iranian-backed troops for help before the Gulf states decided to counter by arming rebels. But Cockburn is correct with his reminder that truth is the first casualty of war. One reason ISIS was so effective is that their media showed a much more real portrayal of events than Iraqi or Syrian state television did, and the whole internet noticed. The greatest value of this book is the author's reminder that the Lebanese civil war lasted 15 years and was a similar cast of characters with no good choices. There were 600 ceasefires that were ineffective or even laughed at, but they saved a lot of lives. He suggests that local ceasefires among the various factions will do a lot to save lives, but what ended the Lebanese civil war, ironically, was when the West finally allowed Syria to assert its control and its army into the country. People finally just got tired of fighting, writes Cockburn. Partitioning Iraq and Syria now would difficult and bloody. Frustratingly to the reader, the author offers no suggestions for ending the conflict in Syria or even a next step. 3 stars out of 5. ----- Other Al Qaeda and ISIS-related books reviewed in 2016: The Siege of Mecca - Yaroslav Trofimov (5 stars) The Bin Ladens - Steve Coll (4 stars) Growing Up Bin Laden - Najwa and Omar Bin Laden (4.5 stars) Guantanamo Diary - Mohamedou Ould Slahi (4.5 stars) The Black Banners - Ali Soufan (5 stars) Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS - Joby Warrick (4.5 stars) Jihad Academy: The Rise of the Islamic State - Nicholas Henin (4.5 stars) ISIS: The State of Terror - Jessica Stern and JM Berger (4 stars) The Jihadis Return by Patrick Cockburn (3 stars) ISIS Exposed - Erick Stackelbeck (2.5 stars) Rise of ISIS - Jay Sekulow and David French (1 star) The Morning They Came for Us: Dispatches from Syria - Janine di Giovanni (review forthcoming) ...more |
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it was amazing
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I found this book to be incredibly readable, insightful, and important. It is ultimately a history of civilization through a modern Muslim worldview.
I found this book to be incredibly readable, insightful, and important. It is ultimately a history of civilization through a modern Muslim worldview. It is unmatched in its breadth. With 4.5 stars, I recommend it in conjunction with and ahead of a host of books I read consecutively (list at the bottom of the post). Destiny Disrupted is excellent. The author is an Afghan-American who is countering Western textbooks which relegate Islam to a relatively unimportant status. His premise is correct, the best schools in America teach courses explaining where we come from, where our Constitution and basis for liberty developed from the Greeks through Christianity through European philosophers to today. Bypassed along the way is the East, including the Middle East-- or, the "Middle World" that the author defines as "the space between Istanbul and China." He hails from an Afghan heritage that prizes itself on its geneology and its Islamic scholarship. He seems to be most familiar with Shiia and Sufi Islam relative to Sunni traditions. Apparently, his own brother became a radical Islamic fundamentalist of some form, and he challenges readers of all stripes to develop a framework with which to address that mindset. Ansary makes the important point that modern Islamic jihad (Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, ISIS, etc.) sees the battle as theological-- whether there is one God or many gods. The West, meanwhile, sees these wars primarily in terms of scarcity-- people frustrated with their political and economic conditions. He rejects the "clash of civilizations" cliche arguing rather that it is "two histories" that are crashing. He critiques both sides' purported views and raises the question of how to create a central, shared history that he sees as essential to co-existence. Many books focus on the early first centuries of Islam's rapid expansion, or the history of the Ottoman Empire, or Central Asia, but Ansary weaves all of the history and geography together over almost two millenia. I learned much from this book and took several pages of notes, too much to provide my usually full summary. I write a more detailed review of my notes on the first half and only summarize the second half below. The author begins with Zoroastrianism, the struggle between light and dark that never ends and has no predestination. The spread of the Parthians in the 3rd century AD led to a revival of Zoroastrianism (and its off-shoots like Manicheasm later confronted by Augustine of Hippo). Ansary recounts the birth of Islam and the first Calipha. "Islam is more about building community than individual salvation," although salvation is earned by proper interaction with the community. Early battles were relatively small but ascribed in the Quran with theological significance. Ansary recounts the early struggle between Abu Bakr and Ali, noting that both Ali and Muhammad were raised by the same father. He describes the second Caliph, Omar (583-684 AD), as a "benevolent reformer" who was pious and made an impact on Islamic doctrine and governance as well as was a brilliant military strategist. In 636 AD, Omar's forces routed the main Byzantine army at the Battle of Yarmouk. Perhaps overlooked by Ansary and other authors is that Omar's forces were also fighting Christian Arabs aiding the Byzantines. As the Byzantines weakened, Arab Muslim invaders filled the void as far as Armenia and eventually conquered Sassanid Persia, where Umar was assassinated. Ansary looks at the few writings available in this period to note that "jihad" had begun to be used as a military term in regards to offense, and not just defense as is sometimes claimed by Muslims today. This was justified by the "house of war, house of Islam" line of thought, which supposedly wasn't introduced until the Umayyad Caliphate in 732. Nonetheless, Omar was tolerant of Christians and Jews, allowing Jews to return to Jerusalem and giving his blessing. His taxes were less than Byzantine taxes, which helped encourage conversions. Omar forbid the temporary marriages during the hajj (that still exist today for men to release their urges) even while blaming women for men's ills. The next period covered is 642-661, beginning with Uthman. Uthman was a wealthy merchant who married Muhammad's daughter and governed from 644-656. He organized and compiled the Quran and engaged in economic reform that enriched the Umayyads at the expense of other parties. His tax policies created unrest in Egypt and Uthman was eventually murdered. (Apparently there is some debate among scholars on the source of unrest.) Aisha, Muhammad's formerly young wife, did not get along with Uthman but also spoke against Ali when he was unable to bring justice to the murderers of Uthman. Ali and Aisha's forces fought in 656, one of the first Muslim civil wars. Aisha's forces were defeated and Ali became Caliph from 656-661. Umayya struggled to gain power, refusing to recognize Ali's legitimacy. Muawiyah declared himself Caliph after Ali's assassination in 661 and fought with Hasan for the title, returning the Caliphate to the Ummayad clan of Uthman and firmly establishing the Umayyad Dynasty. Chapter five chronicles the Umayyad period of 661-737 AD. Muawiyah appointed his son Yazid as successor Caliph, but he was rivaled by Hussein ibn Ali, Muhammad's grandson who contested the right to be Caliph. Yazid defeated Hussein's forces at Karbala in 680 and Hussein was killed, thus creating the Sunni-Shiia rift that exists today. The Sunni believe in following the Sunna-- Muhammad's example-- for salvation. The Shia believe in following an Imam, a psiritual figure that is to follow. "Instructions (Sunna) are not enough." The Shia Imam is a "bestower of grace." Belief in Hussein is necessary for a Shia to get into heaven, which is anathema to Sunnis. (I wonder if this is all exactly accurate or a summation of the author's belief or understanding.) Yazid reigned only from 680-683 and the the Umayyad's consolidated power by fortifying Muslim cities which were growing and prosperous. The Umayyad economy favored the landed classes, Arabic became the official language of government as well as religion, leading to greater Arabization of the conquered territories. That spread eastward into Central Asia and Westward through the Maghreb and into Spain. The next period, Chapter Six, is 737-963 AD. Ansary introduces the purist Kharijites that modern-day ISIS have been compared to. A Khariji assassinated Ali during the First Fitna, or civil war, these rejected the Ummayad Caliphate. Kharijis rebelled against the Abbasid Caliphate in the late 800s. ISIS apparently rejects the comparison; the Kharijites died out eventually. There were also the Hashemites, descendants of Muhammad's daughter Fatima, from Iraq who were anti-Arab and anti-Umayyad. Al Abbas was an uncle of Muhammad from whom the Hashemites/Abbasids claimed their heritage. A Third Fitna, civil war, happened in 744 over a dispute over succession after Caliph al-Walid II was overthrown in 744. In 747, Abu Muslim led the Hashimite forces against the Umayyads, flying black banners. While Abu Muslim was really in charge, Abu al-Abbas was declared Caliph in 749 and the Abbasid armies pushed out from Iraq and defeated the Ummayads, finally. Abu Muslim was murdered in 755 over fear of his power as the Abbasids consolidated. The Abbasids supposedly included Persians, Jews, and Nestorian Christians in their governance. Al-Mansur founded Baghdad as the Abbasid capital in 762. Ansary looks at the development of Islam and culture from 632-1111 AD. He explains the origins of the Five Pillars, the issues dealing with all of the 700,000 Hadiths and controversies, the concept of Ejtihad, the four schools of Sunni legal thought, and more. The Abbasids took great interest in Greek thought, translating (and thus preserving) Greek texts into Arabic. Of interest to me was Abu Yusuf al-Kindi (801-873), who was a philosopher and polymath scholar of the Greek arts. Al Kindi is who is thought of when looking at Arabic contributions to astronomy, mathematics, medicine, etc. Al Kindi dealt with logic. Other authors I have read have noted the battle of Western logic having been lost as conservative forces pushed against scholars like Al Kindi. Ibn Hanbal was another influential Iraqi who collected and studied hadiths, compiling an encyclopedia. He founded the Hanbali school of Islamic law which is prominent in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states today. Ibn Hanbal was imprisoned for his refusal to bow to Caliph al-Ma'mun's demand that he recant his belief that the Quran was uncreated and eternal. al-Ma'mun subscribed to an applied form of rationalism to Islam, the Mu'tazila. This dealt with the problem of evil, predestination, and other issues that were being wrestled with both in Greek thought and in Christianity as well. Ibn Hanbal's refusal led to his imprisonment, but the empowerment of this doctrine such that a couple of Caliph's later, it apparently became official orthodox doctrine that the Quran was uncreated. Ibn Hanbal had rejected the use of logic and reason in approaching the Quran and Islam and that would ultimately win the day. I found Ansary's description of Sufis to be intriguing, similar to what was presented by Reza Aslan's book on Islam. Sufis wrote about devoted love of God, passionate love letters that read more like the Psalms or Song of Solomon than the Quran. Sufis developed at the same time as the work of Arabic philosophers who were both critiquing and revising Greek philosophy, trying to relate science and religion with matters of the heart as in Sufi Islam. Conservative forces have tended to drown out these voices. The second half of the book deals with the rise of the Turks and the spread Eastward. Chapter Eight begins with 737-1095 AD. The Abbasid's great land mass may have made them ultimately weaker. 1071 saw the Battle of Manzikert between the Seljuks and what remained of Rome. From 1031-1381, the Crusades begin, historians count eight separate ones. It is the Crusaders who massacre fellow Christians in Constantinople, Jews in Jerusalem, and Muslims on the battle field. The Crusaders were able to play the Egyptians off the Seljuks off the Abbasids. While Ansary argues (above) "jihad" was used early in Muslim history as it spread by the sword, the term "jihad" against the Crusaders wasn't used for a long time. Attempts to resurrect the word "fell flat." The author chronicles the rise of various cults and splits, like the 1100s cult of assassins who killed clerics and leaders alike. There is the rise of Saladin, who shoed mercy and promised protection of minorities when liberating Jerusalem from the Crusades. The Muslim world than deals with threat from the East from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, who takes China in 1211 AD and enters the Central Asian steppe in 1218, quickly confronting the Abbasids and trampling Persia. The next period is 1263-1600 AD, the "rebirth" under Tamerlane the Cruel and the "Back to Koran" movement of conservatives. Ansary speculates that the insecurity that Muslims feel throughout their history as their territory is faced with division and weakness lead to a conservative backlash. Many historians and sociologists agree with this, look at Tea Party conservative politics in America for a recent example. Drawing on the legacy of Ibn Hanbal, who rejected the use of Greek ideas of logic and reason, others like Ibn al-Salah rejected philosophy and rhetoric as degenerate. Ibn Salah and ibn Taymiyyah are considered the forerunners of the Salafi movement. Taymiyyah emphasized that Islam must return to a "pure" understanding of the "salaf," the first generations of Muslims, which is propogated by Wahabbists today. (It strikes me here that perhaps it is at this junction that "Muslim reformers" like Aslan and Maajid Nawaz can make a case against ISIS' treatment of women and minorities: The earliest Muslims were largely tolerant of minorities as they swept rapidly across their lands, preserving churches in places like Damascus and Jerusalem. Khadija, Muhammad's first wife, was a wealthy woman who was influential in his life. Aisha, according to tradition, played an active role in politics and Islamic teaching after Muhammad's death.) The author takes a swipe at Christianity's view of sex which is a strawman based on a stereotype of unbiblical doctrine. He chronicles the rise of Sufi orders, particularly in places like Anatolia covering the period of 700-1300 AD. There's Rumi, orders of Ghazi "warrior poets," and others. He deals with Ottoman issues like tax farming and regional governance and dealing with ethnic and religious minorities in the region. There is a return to the Safavids in Persia, rivals with the Ottomans, and an explanation of the further development of Shiia doctrine, including the concept of the Mahdi (which also exists in Sunni islam to various extents). The Mongols largely embrace Islam which spreads from Burma to Afghanistan. A Sufi blend of Islam is embraced in India as it syncretizes well with local Hindu practices and arts. 1600 brings the "nadir" of the Islamic Empire, which is followed by divisions that eventually pave the way for tribal and ethnic breaks. Next is 1291-1600 Europe: Europeans develop their navies to facilitate trade by sea around Muslims. In the 12th century, Europeans discovered Arabic translations and Latin translations of Arabic translations of Aristotle and Plato and other philosophers and then began trying to reconcile it with religious thought while never appreciating the Muslim additions and pondering where they came from. Ansary gives a quick overview of the Reformation and its development. Islam made similar scientific discoveries as Europe, but it did not result in a new scientific worldview-- perhaps because of the rise of the nation-state. The Reformation disarmed the nation-state of its church and state unified nationalism that Islam adheres to. It allowed for uniform government across all people and usually in one language. 1500-1850 AD, "The West Comes East" as Suleyman the Magnifienct fails to take Vienna and the Ottoman Empire is finished expanding. The Ottoman economy required constant expansion and extraction, when expansion stopped then things started to stagnate (see Robinson and Acemoğlu's excellent Why Nations Fail). The Great Game ensues as the British Empire encroaches on the Russian Empire's frontier and moves into India. Mohammed Ali comes to power in Egypt. From 1737-1918 AD there are reform movements. A need for modernism within Islam and the Ottoman Empire is felt. Islamic reforms are related but unrelated to European political and economic reforms and the Reformation. There were three approaches: 1. Wahabbist originalism as seen in Saudi Arabia as Abdul Wahab joins forces with Ibn Saud. This required Mohammed Ali from Egypt to restore Ottoman rule in Saudi Arabia. 2. Syed Ahmad Khan in India called for submission to English rule and colonialism. He believed in a contextualized Quran that needed historical-contextual reading based on Quranic principles. He was clearly opposed by Hindu nationalists and more conservative Muslims. Ahmad Khan promoted Urdu, which is a mixture of Hindi Persian. 3. Sayyid Jamal al-Afghani who believed in Pan-Arabism. Afghani had traveled in the UK and throughout the Ottoman Empire and outside in Afghanistan. After initially being invited to Iran, he is later expelled for preaching against monarch's bowing to Western imperialism and organizing a boycott of English tobacco. al-Afhani embraced Western science but not Western morals, or the perceived lack thereof. Ansary also highlights other reformers in Iran. The rise of Constitutionalism, Nationalism, Industrialism, and Zionism spelled doom for the Ottoman Empire. 1856 reforms were hailed as the Turkish Sultan increasingly gave way to the increasingly Westward desire found in Istanbul as young Turks studying in Europe for the first time came back and wanted to see reforms and modernization. After lowering of tariffs put Ottoman merchants at a disadvantage against the more advanced British and others, reforms were seen as benefiting primarily Armenians. From 1894-1896, 300,000 Armenians would die. Young Turks and pan-Turkish nationalism rose on the eve of World War I, while the British were promising sovereignty to the Hashemites and the House of Saud in exchange for military support against the Ottomans and later oil. Ansary chronicles the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the six pillars of Kemalism. The author writes that Wahhabism rising in Saudi Arabia was "as just a new innovation as secularism." Sayyid Qutb, jailed in the early 1960s founds the Muslim Brotherhood and sets off a wave of conservative Islamism at the same time that Nasser and Baathist rivals compete for leadership in the realm of Pan Arabism. Ansary notes this period empowered and energized both secular-leaning nationalist Baathists and religious-leaning Muslim Brotherhood. Islamism would take arms against the USSR in Afghanistan, and then return home demanding Islamist reforms. Ansary writes that the modern jihadist sees the fight against the USSR and the United Stateas as similar to the wars against the Byzantines in the days of the Salaf. Ansary makes the important point that modern jihad sees the battle as theological-- whether there is one God or many gods. The West, meanwhile, sees the problem as primarily one of scarcity-- people frustrated with their economic conditions. He rejects the "clash of civilizations" motif arguing rather that it is "two histories crashing." He critiques both sides' purported views and raises the question of how to create a central, shared history that recognizes all of the above. 4.5 stars out of 5. Other books read concurrently: In God's Path - The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire - Hoyland (4 stars) In the The Shadow of the Sword - Tom Holland (4 stars) Brief History of the Middle East - Peter Mansfield History of the Arab Peoples - Albert Hourani The United States and the Middle East 1914-2001 by Salim Yuqub (Great Courses) A Very Short Introduction to the Koran - Michael Cook (4.5) A Very Short Introduction to Islam - Malise Ruthven (3 stars) Sam Harris and Maajid Nawaz - Islam and the Future of Tolerance (1.5 stars) Reza Aslan - No god but God - The Origins and Future of Islam (2.5 stars) Islam Unveiled - Robert Spencer (1 star) Also recommend: Desperately Seeking Paradise by Ziauddin Sardar (5 stars) ...more |
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it was amazing
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One of the best memoirs I have ever read, especially by a Cabinet member. This is a helpful book both in terms of an example of both management and le
One of the best memoirs I have ever read, especially by a Cabinet member. This is a helpful book both in terms of an example of both management and leadership; not only of Gates' styles and practices but also Bush and Obama's. I contrast this to Timothy Geithner's memoir which contained nothing in the way of describing leadership or management. "I did not like my job," "I loathed the job," etc. Gates did not seek the job nor did he want to stay there. He became too emotionally involved (quite obvious if you saw the 60 Minutes interview with him) to make unbiased decisions about the "young men and women" he was trying his best to protect. Gates was over an agency with 3.2 million employees and a $1 trillion budget. He gives insight into the management of that budget, as he was heavily involved (and praised) for cutting programs, pushing back against Congress' projects, and moving funding to programs that badly needed it. When he went to Washington he sought the counsel of many, and I appreciated his sharing that process. Every good leader and manager learns from other leaders and managers. Gates already enjoyed bipartisan support and friendships from having served in seven previous administrations, Obama was the 8th President he served. He was also the first Secretary of Defense ever to work for consecutive Presidents from two different political parties. That makes this book an unprecedented read. This book is very relevant to several current events, and I find that not enough commentators seem to have read Gates' memoirs. Gates was a Russian history scholar which led him into the CIA in 1968. He understands Putin as one who longs for a previous version of Russian empire. Gates is critical of NATO's aggressive expansion in the 1990s, seeing it from Putin's point of view. He told Putin that he would not accept international criticism over moving troops from Texas to California, so he completely understood why Putin chafed at criticism of Russian bases in the Ukraine and Central Asia. He essentially predicts what Russian reaction would be if it saw Ukraine moving Westward. Gates opposed the Obama Administration's desire to create a no-fly zone in Libya as a costly misuse of resources with unintended consequences. "I was stubborn, but not insubordinate." He (and allegedly Secretary of State Clinton) repeatedly criticizes the Administration's micromanagement of military actions as unprecedented compared to the seven previous administrations (except Nixon) under which Gates had worked. Candidate Obama argued that the President did not have the authority to unilaterally order military action in a foreign country without an imminent threat to the U.S. Various lawyers from Defense and the State Department contended that he had no authority to engage forces in Libya for more than 60 days. President Obama instead sided with White House lawyers that argued that he could keep forces engaged there indefinitely. The micromanagement continued in other areas such as Hatian relief. Gates worried about the influence of the Israelis and the Saudis in the Bush White House. He did not want to attack Iran, basically sees himself as getting the administration out of that jam. Only time he "lost his cool" was with King Abdullah, who was wa xing forth about the weakness of the U.S. and how he wanted the U.S. to protect Saudi Arabia by attacking Iran. Gates did not like talk of sacrifice of U.S. men & women when the Saudis were willing to sacrifice nothing. Abdullah described Gates as "turning over the table" in the meeting. Abdullah thanked him for his candor and said it was the first time he actually knew the Administration's true position. Gates writes that the State Department recommended Obama not say much during Iran's Green Revolution, but in hindsight he thinks the Administration should have been more vocal in support of the protests. Gates also worked to reform the Department of Veteran Affairs after scandals involving mistreatment of soldiers. He worried that his successor would not be up to the task of keeping VA's feet to the fire to reform. He particularly worked on better information flow going to veterans who were seeking care in a complicated system. He does not have high praise for VA. There is little insight into Syria, but Gates opposed open American assistance for the Israelis in bombing a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, which Israel later did itself. He never directly criticizes Rumsfeld or other predecessors, but it's clear he felt he'd inherited a mismanaged mess. Besides the VA messes, Afghanistan had gotten woefully little attention and too many programs pushed by congressmen eager for jobs and votes had been unopposed. Gates entered the Bush Administration after serving on the Iraq Study Group that, among other things, recommended a large increase in troop presence to stem the violence. He admired Bush's courage for going with "the surge" after most of the top generals opposed it. Gates cites the acquisition and further development of armored MRAP vehicles as his biggest personal accomplishment, saving hundreds of lives and limbs from IEDs. He was frustrated in pushing against his commanders who did not want the vehicle. I think he felt we did the best we could in Iraq, providing security and an opportunity for the fledgling democracy to get off the ground, but knew it was always too much to expect the Iraqis to build a functioning democracy and federal government the likes of which it had never seen before. He never trumpets political successes in Iraq the way Bush and Condoleeza Rice do in their memoirs. Obama disappointed Gates in being different on issues as a candidate than he was as President. He felt that Obama campaigned on more attention for Afghanistan but that, once in office, Obama never had "passion for the mission." Gates laments that Joe Biden decided to be an even stronger influence on the President than Dick Cheney had been, something contrary to what Biden had said during the campaign. Biden and other staffers were constantly putting articles and opinions in front of Obama to argue that his generals were borderline insubordinate and trying to undermine confidence in the White House. Gates heard Obama say "I am giving an order," which he'd never known a President or any other civilian leader (including Secretary of Defense) say. Gates was offended by the statement and writes that it shows Obama and Biden's unfamiliarity with military culture. In Obama's defense, he did agree to a troop surge. "The mission" in Afghanistan was never quite clear, which Gates also admits. Is it building a strong central government? Defeating the Taliban (which is ultimately impossible)? Gates admits that in some situations it is impossible to "win" but very possible to "lose," which he was afraid of in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Gates just hated how much domestic politics played into Obama's decisions and how all actions were so micromanaged. He felt the Stanley McChrystal affair was inevitable. Biden and other advisers were just looking for an opportunity for Obama to take a public action that would show that he was "in charge" over his military leadership.Gates was sickened by the politics and wanted to resign in 2010. He and Admiral Mullen are repeatedly put in awkward situations as the young Obama team criticizes Bush-era decisions that Gates and Mullen were instrumental in influencing. Biden seems eager to abandon Afghanistan altogether. He contrast's Obama's lack of desire to forge working relationships with other foreign leaders with that of Bush and other presidents. But both Bush and Obama made decisions that went against their political base, decisions for which Gates has "utmost respect." However, the Obama White House was in campaign mode and put much more weight on domestic political concerns than the Bush team. Gates' harshest criticism of Obama comes from Obama having broken his word to Gates twice in the budget process, after Gates had worked out numbers with both Obama and the OMB director (both Orszag and Lew).One time, Obama gave Gates an expensive bottle of vodka and an apology for "driving him to drink." He felt Obama also went against his word in the process of repealing Don't Ask Don't Tell. Obama was frustrated with procedure and enforcement of laws he believed were wrong. (This is disturbing to me as the President should not feel above the law, didn't we learn this problem with Nixon?) "I'm the leader of the free world and I can't do anything," Obama is quoted as saying. Gates writes that Obama is pragmatic, thoughtful and professional in his anger, his feelings always passed quickly. Gates also has harsh criticism for Congress, even though he maintains a respect for their role. He laments the current "scorched earth" battle between Congress and the White House for political points. He admits that both Congress and the media treated him very kindly compared to other high-ranking officials. He had good relationships with both parties, including with Secretary of State Clinton. Both Obama and Gates treated Gates with "great generosity." In the end, Gates hung on because of the kids on the battlefield. It was awkward him to meet A&M graduates to whom he had handed diplomas to (as President of Texas A&M) on the battlefield. He was not above weeping in front of them.This is a great memoir of someone who hated his job yet did it remarkably well and had unprecedented bipartisan respect. 5 stars, must read ...more |
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| 0743253396
| 9780743253390
| 0743253396
| 3.90
| 1,509
| Mar 16, 2004
| Oct 05, 2004
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liked it
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A good book about the relationship between many high-ups in the Republican party and the royal family of Saudi Arabia and the Bin Laden family who ow
A good book about the relationship between many high-ups in the Republican party and the royal family of Saudi Arabia and the Bin Laden family who own a large construction company. An unexpected star in the book is actually Bluegrass Airport. On 9/11 many rich Saudis, members of the royal family, Bin Laden's family, etc. were in Le xing ton, KY buying horses. While the rest of national airspace was closed, someone high up in the U.S. gov't authorized the evacuation of Saudis from around the country. They flew first to Le xing ton, then got on a big 747 and flew away, eventually to Saudi Arabia. Some of these folks would have been worth interrogating, particularly those related to Bin Laden, and others who had ties to the bombers. The book is sad because it shows how we're so tied into Saudi Arabia that we'll never be able to fully fight terrorism (see my previous posts on this subject). ...more |
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Jul 2005
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Jan 12, 2014
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| 186207755X
| 9781862077553
| 186207755X
| 3.91
| 542
| 2004
| Jan 01, 2005
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it was amazing
| This book was recommended to me about 5 years ago, I bought it but never got around to reading it. That was a mistake. I reviewed a book on chaos theo This book was recommended to me about 5 years ago, I bought it but never got around to reading it. That was a mistake. I reviewed a book on chaos theory earlier in the year and discovered that its author was the same. Sardar is a scientist and deep intellectual. Moreover, he is a learner and a seeker, and so I felt an instant connection to him. Sardar has traveled the world and seen all sides of the umma, and desperately wishes to save it from itself. The book chronicles years in England spent learning from Muslim scholars, years spent in Saudi Arabia bemoaning the Kingdom's destruction of history and ruining the hajj by clogging it with modern pollution, and years spent watching the Muslim world turn more and more insular and backward. Sardar's circle of intellectual scholars write articles and advise governments to seemingly no avail. He was at a meeting in Pakistan when Osama bin Laden and others in the mujahideen could not find a way to reconcile their differences, and the future was clear. They reached a ghastly depression when their fears were realized on 9/11 and afterward. I enjoyed Sardar's observations in his travels to places like Turkey, Syria, and Iran. I learned about how much hope the umma placed in the Iranian revolution, and how bad it was when those hopes were dashed by the violent tyranny that emerged. All along the way, Sardar explains ancient Muslim history and philosophy, illustrating the different schools of thought and what they mean for today. I learned a great deal about Islam that I never knew before. Sardar's problems with Muslim clerics today are very similar to the ones I have with evangelical pastors. If you're an American who thinks he knows a decent amount about Islam, or has read several books on the subject, think again and afresh and read this book. Sardar believes in a pluralist Islam. It's not clear to me why he rejects Christianity. It seems to me that what he's looking for is clearly found in Jesus and the teachings of the Bible. I'd love to have a conversation with him. This book was better than I could have imagined, and much different. Wish I had read it 5 years ago. 5 stars out of 5. ...more |
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| 1400031257
| 9781400031252
| 1400031257
| 3.63
| 2,514
| Sep 11, 2002
| Aug 12, 2003
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really liked it
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